



BATAVIA ILLUSTRATA.

OR, AN

ENQUIRY

INTO THE


POLICY *and* COMMERCE

OF THE

UNITED PROVINCES.

OF THE

Low Countries.



PART III.





UNITED STATES

OF THE

SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

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BATAVIA ILLUSTRATA.

PART III.

*An ENQUIRY into the ALLIANCES of
the STATES GENERAL, &c.*

INTRODUCTION:



ALL Conventions between Sovereign Princes, and States, are either Treaties of Peace and Commerce, or Treaties of Alliance. The *First*, which contain a mutual Promise, to do each Other no Injury, and to permit a free and

and reciprocal Intercourse between the Subjects of either Nation, are founded in the *Law of Nature*, which obliges Us to concur to the Preservation of one another. But the *Second*, which bind the contracting Parties, to the Performance of Something, which It may be They would not do, except in Consideration of the *Treaty* into which They have entered, are not always grounded on the *Law of Nature*, tho' They ought to be consistent with It; nor are They always consistent with the true Interest of the *State*, tho' They are always concluded under that Pretext.

Peace is necessary to every Country in Proportion to the Extent of its Commerce; but Experience shews Us, that Treaties are ineffectual to secure that Blessing, and as soon as *Peace* interferes, either with the Glory of a *Prince*, the particular Views of his *Ministers*, or the private Advantage of the *ruling* Members in a *Republic*, from that Moment it becomes precarious. The Name of the *public Interest* is speciously employ'd to destroy the *public Faith*, and the true Sense of a Treaty is quibbled away, or glossed over, agreeable to the good Pleasure of those that are strongest; so that a *State* ought not to expect *Peace*, any longer than
She

She is in a Condition to make *War* with Advantage.

PHILIP de COMMINES, speaking with his usual Simplicity, of the Treaties and Negotiations that were carried on between his Master LEWIS XI, and the DUKES of NORMANDY and BRITANY, says, there was a continual Succession of *Embassadors* between the *King* and those *Princes*, as well as between his *Majesty* and the DUKE of BURGUNDY; *Not to cultivate or entertain a good Correspondence between Them, but to make Discoveries; carry Intelligence; to bribe, suborn and debauch each others Ministers and Subjects, employing all sorts of Artifice and Treachery, under the specious Pretext of the public Faith, and the honourable Title of an Embassy.* Our King CHARLES II, attacked the *Dutch Smirna Fleet*, 1665, without any previous Declaration of *War*; and in that which LEWIS XIV, published against the Republic of the *United Provinces* in 1672, the only Reason his *Most Christian Majesty* thought fit to assign for It, was *That He was dissatisfied with the Conduct of the STATES GENERAL and could no longer dissemble his Indignation, without a Diminution of his Glory;* wherefore He determined to make *War* upon Them by *Sea and Land.*

It seems unnecessary to cite more Examples to shew the little Dependance that is to be had on the most solemn Engagements between different Nations. To speak Truth, Treaties of *Alliance*, owe their Invention to the Infidelity, of *Princes* and *Regents*; and, generally speaking, are no more than *provisional* Engagements, entered into for the Support of former *Treaties* of *Peace*, or the Punishment of Those that infringe Them. It were to be wished indeed, that *Trading Countries*, could subsist without any Engagements of this Kind, because then They would offend Nobody, and their *Commerce* would be *open* and *general*. I believe, I may say, This is no where better understood than in *Holland*; and yet, such has been the Fate of the *United Provinces*, that between the Ambition of their *Stadt-holders*, the ill Faith of some of their Neighbours, and the Jealousy of others, the *Republic* has never once seen it self in a State of Independancy; but has been obliged to found its Security in *foreign Alliances*, both Defensive and Offensive, tho' Nothing be more repugnant to its real Interests.

S E C T.



S E C T. I.
OF THE
ALLIANCES
OF THE
STATES GENERAL
With the
EMPEROR.

*Including an Examination of the 5th
and 6th Articles of the Treaty of Munster,
and of the Emperor's Right to set up the
Ostend Company.*



FROM the Abdication of the
EMPEROR, CHARLES V, and
the Partition of his Domi-
nions, to the Formation of the
first Grand Alliance, in 1689;
the German Branch of the
Austrian Family, was of little Weight in
Europe

Europe, except within the Limits of the *Empire*. The EMPEROR was then, with Regard to the *United Provinces*, what possibly the *King of Poland* may be now; too weak to hurt Them, and situated at too great a Distance, to help Them in any Extremity; so that His *Alliance* could only serve to engage the *States* in Enterprizes contrary to their Interest without being of any Utility to Them. But since the Year 1689, or rather, since 1701, that upon the Death of CHARLES II, *King of Spain*, the *Second Grand Alliance* was formed for the Support of his *Imperial Majesty's* Pretentions to the *Spanish Monarchy*, the EMPEROR is become of very great Importance to the *Southern* Parts of *Europe*, as well as to Those who lye *Northward* of the *Rhine*.

That which renders his *Imperial Majesty* of immediate Consequence to the *Dutch*, is the Possession of the *Austrian Netherlands*, yielded to Him by the Treaty of *Utrecht*, and confirmed by that of the *Barrier*, concluded at *Antwerp*, in 1715.

Whoever will be at the Pains of considering the former State of those *Provinces*, and comparing it with the Provision made for their Government, and Defence, by the last-mentioned Treaty, will find, that, supposing the *Austrian Netherlands* in the Hands
of

of a Friend, They are a more effectual *Barrier* to the *United Provinces* against *France*, than They have been, at any Time since the *Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle* concluded in 1668. But if we consider the *Emperor*, as an Enemy to the *States General*, the same Countries, in that Case, will be found less formidable to the *United Provinces*, upon the present Establishment, than They were, when under the Obedience of the *King of Spain*.

The better to comprehend this, we must consider, that the Towns and Citadels of *Namur* and *Tournay*, with *Menin*, *Ipres*, *Furnes*, *Warneton*, and *Fort Knocque*, which form a Chain of Garrisons upon the Frontier of the *Austrian Netherlands* towards *France*, are committed to the Custody of the *States General*, who Garrison Them entirely with their own Troops, and are obliged in Point of Interest, as well as by Treaty, to keep the Fortifications in good Repair, and the Towns well supplied with Ammunition, and all military Stores, necessary for the support of a Siege: So that, in the case of an Attack from the side of *France*, it is not to be doubted, that the *Barrier* of the *Netherlands*, would be well defended, or at least, much better than when it was in the Hands of the *Spaniards*,

Spaniards, who for a great Number of Years, have never been able to look the *French* in the Face, or hinder their encroachments upon the *Frontier* of *Flanders*.

But if, on the contrary, we suppose the *EMPEROR* an Enemy to the *States General*, we shall then find the *Netherlands* less formidable to the *United Provinces*, than when they made a Part of the *Spanish* Dominions. For tho' it be much more easy for the *Emperor*, to march an *Army* into *Flanders*, than it was for the *Spaniards* to Transport a Body of Troops thither, after the Reduction of their *Naval Force*; And tho' it be true, that *Holland* is liable to be attacked from the *Province* of *Brabant*; yet, when we remember, that by virtue of the Towns above-mentioned, the *Dutch* have it in their Power, to let the *French* into the very Heart of *Flanders*, from whence they have been so hardly driven by the *United Arms*, of almost all the Powers of *Europe*; It cannot be imagined, that the *Emperor* will reduce the *States General*, to the Necessity of having Recourse to so violent and dangerous a Remedy. And this single Consideration, I speak it with the utmost Deference however, seems to me, more than sufficient to justify the moderate Conduct of *Great Britain* and the

the *United Provinces*, since the late Rupture with the *Emperor*: because, according to all the Rules of Prudence and Policy, his *Imperial Majesty*, must at last acquiesce, and content Himself with possessing the *Netherlands* upon the Footing prescrib'd by the *Barrier Treaty*, rather than run the Hazard of losing Them entirely, which must inevitably be the Case, if the Allies of *Hanover* once come to act *Offensively*; unless we can suppose the *Emperor* able to send an Army into *Flanders*, strong enough to beat the *United Forces* of *France*, *England*, and *Holland* out of the Field; which I presume, there is no *Imperialist* sanguine enough to imagine.

The Garrison of *Dendermonde*, is made up jointly of *Dutch* and *Imperialists*, but the Governour is nominated by the *Emperor*. (a) It were very much to be wished, however, that not only this Town, but that *Nieuport* and *Ghent*, were also in the Hands of the *States General*, agreeable to the 1st *Barrier Treaty*, of 1709. *Newport*, would render the *Barrier*, or the Chain of Towns, upon the *Frontier* of *Flan-*

(a) See the *Barrier Treaty* of 1715, concluded at *Antwerp*.

ders, more compleat ; and the sole possession of *Dendermonde* and *Ghent*, would secure the Communication between the Barrier Towns and the '*United Provinces*, which is now liable to be interrupted. And besides this, had the *Dutch* been in Possession of *Ghent*, I believe the *Ostend Company's* Charter had never been granted ; because it would then have been in the Power of the *States General*, to break the Communication between *Bruges* and the Rest of *Flanders* and *Brabant*, which would have been an invincible Obstacle to the Commerce of *Ostend*.

His *Imperial Majesty*, has already consented to suspend his *Indian Trade* for seven Years ; and I cannot doubt, but He will at last, revoke his Charter. However, as the *Ostend Company*, is yet one of those Points which employ the Politicks of almost every Court of *Europe*, I flatter my self, the Reader will pardon me at least, if I attempt to set the Question in the truest Light I can, by describing the State of *Spain*, and the *United Provinces*, before the Treaty of *Munster*, and by adding all that I have been able to gather from very intelligent Persons, both *Dutch* and *Imperialists*, in support of their different Pretensions ; with my Reflections upon
on

on the Consequences that must naturally rise from the Prosperity of the *Ostend Company*, and the Revolutions that may be expected, both in Commerce and otherwise, should it be suffered to subsist.

The learned Monsieur *Barbeyrac*, (*) observes upon this Subject, that It was not to be wondered, common Men, little acquainted with the History of past Ages, and still less, with the particular Maxims of Government; very easy on the other Hand, about the Infraction of *Treaties*, provided they find their Account in it, should abet a Project, which could not be executed, without giving a stab to public Faith; because, Men of this Make are the Growth of every Climate, and of every Age. But that such a Project could be entertained by the *Imperial Council*, and patronised by the Emperor, was what *Monsieur Barbeyrac* could not so well account for. (a)

That His *Imperial Majesty*, under the Weight of so many high Obligations, to *England* and *Holland*, should in open, and manifest

* Professor of the Civil Law at *Groningen*, and Member of the Royal Accademy of Sciences at *Berlin*.

(a) *Defense du Droit de la Compagnie Hollandoise des Indes orientales, &c.* A la Haye, 1725.

Violation of so many *Treaties* entered into by his *Ancestors*, and confirmed by *Himself*, strike directly at the most important Interests of both the *Nations*; that instead of acknowledging the Services that have been done Him, at the expence of so much *Blood* and *Treasure*, and repaying Them with acts of Friendship, he should endeavour to tear out their Bowels; is, it must be owned, extreamly surprizing, and a very great Reflection upon the *Emperor's* Gratitude and Equity. Whether this be the Case, or not, shall be the Subject of the following Enquiry; which I the rather undertake, as I every where find many well meaning Persons, who can very hardly persuade Themselves, that the Conduct of the Court of *Vienna*, upon this Occasion, is not grounded upon Right; because the *Exclusion* of a whole People, say They, from any particular Branch of *Commerce*, seems to have something in it contrary to the *Law of Nature*; upon which, all *Conventions* and *Treaties*, ought to be grounded.

In order to take a full and dispassionate View of the *Emperor's* Right to grant the *Ostend* Charter, we must go back, and examine the State and Circumstances of *Spain* and the *United Provinces*, before the Peace of *Munster*, and the several Interests that might

might engage either *Power*, to conclude that *Treaty*.

The People of the *United Provinces*, had supported Themselves in their Revolt from the Crown of *Spain*, with wonderful Success: When in 1609, a *Truce* was concluded between Them for twelve Years, under the Mediation of *France*, and *Philip III*, King of *Spain*, then acknowledged the *States General* as Sovereigns of a free and independant People. By the fourth Article of this *Treaty*, the King of *Spain* consents, that the People of the *United Netherlands* should remain in the peaceable Possession of the Places They then held in the *Indies*, and the Exercise of their *Navigation*. He prohibits only the *Dutch Commerce* to such Places in *India*, as were then possessed by the *Spaniards*, without special Passports, but leaves Them an entire liberty to drive on their Trade with his *European Subjects*, and with all other *Powers out of Europe*, that were willing to deal with Them. (a)

(a) See the 4th Article of the Treaty at large: History of the Low Countries, by *Emanuel van Meteren*, French Edit. Lib. 30. Fol. 658. Also the Negotiations of President *Jeannin*.

It may not be improper to remark, that the ten *Provinces* of the *Netherlands*, which remained in Subjection to SPAIN, were at this very time *excluded* from trading to the *Indies*, where They never had carried on the least *Commerce*, both by the *Laws* of their own *Sovereigns*, (b) and the *Decree* of the POPE, (c) which as *zealous Roman Catholics*, They were obliged to observe. PHILIP II, upon the Marriage of his Daughter, the *Infanta*, ISSABELLA CLARA EUGENIA, with the ARCH-DUKE ALBERT of AUSTRIA, gave Her by way of *Dowry*, these *ten obedient Provinces*, as They are stiled; but it is *expressly stipulated* in an Article of the *Donation*, that the *Sovereignty* of the said *Provinces* is conferred, (d) under this Condition, and not otherwise, that *neither the Infanta, her Husband, nor their Successors, on whom the said Provinces might devolve, should in any wise negotiate, traffick, or contract in the East or West-Indies; nor should They send any Ships thither, under any Title or Pre-*

(b) See Monsieur *Westerveen's* Dissertation, *Dutch*, Sect. IV.

(c) See *Mariana de Rebus Hisp.* Lib. 26, chap. 3. and *Selden, Mare clausum*, Lib. 1. chap. 22. page 161.

(d) See the History of *Emanuel van Meteren*, french Translation.

tence whatsoever, upon Penalty, in case of Contravention, that the Sovereignty of the said Countries should be forfeited. And if any of the Subjects, of the said Provinces, should presume to trade to the *Indies*, contrary to the *Meaning*, and *Intention* of these Prohibitions, their *Sovereigns* should punish them with the *Confiscation* of their Goods, and even with *Death*.

The new *Republic* had just began to taste the happy effects of *Peace*, and *Liberty*; when upon the Expiration of the twelve Years *Truce*, both Sides prepared to renew their Hostilities with fresh Vigour, and double Animosity. My Subject does not permit Me, to relate the *Events* of the *War*, which lasted for twenty seven Years, till it was put an end to by the famous Treaty of MUNSTER, concluded in 1648, an Epocha of the greatest Importance to the *United Provinces*.

For some Years past, the Point of greatest Consideration with the STATES GENERAL, had been, how They might best maintain that *Liberty* They had acquired. Some thought an Accommodation with SPAIN the best means to secure This, and Others preferred *War* to an uncertain *Peace*. The *Province* of *Holland* was for an Accommodation, because she bore more than *Half* the

the *Burthen* of the *War*, and was *one Hundred and forty Millions in Debt*. (a) To this, we may add, that the *DUTCH* then began to suspect their Allies the *FRENCH*, whose *Frontiers* advanced nearer to those of the *United Provinces*, in Proportion, as their *Conquests* encreased in *Flanders*. And besides this, *FREDERIC HENRY*, *PRINCE of ORANGE*, *Stadtholder* and *Captain-General*, of the *United Provinces*, was now grown Old and Infirm, and seemed to Patronize those who were for putting an end to the *War*.

If *Peace* was now become convenient for the *Dutch*, it was at the same time absolutely necessary for the *Spaniards*, who were reduced to a very deplorable Condition. They were at open War with *FRANCE*, and the Campaign was begun with the defeat of their Army at *Avein*, under *PRINCE THOMAS*, of *Savoy*. (b) The *Spanish Infantry*, so famous for a long train of glorious Actions, had been destroy'd at the Battle of *ROCROY*, by the *DUKE of ANGUIEN*, afterwards *PRINCE of CONDE*, and the Rapidity

(a) See *Annales des Provinces unies*, par Monsieur *Basnage*. Lib. I. Fol. 14.

(b) See *Basnage*, ut supra. Fol. 16.

of his Conquests in *Flanders*, gave the *French* hopes of taking the rest of the *Netherlands*, in a single Campaign. *Catalonia* had revolted and put herself under the *French* Protection. *Roussillon* was reduced by the Conquest of *Perpignan* and *Roses*. The PORTUGUEZE had shook off the *Castilian Yoke*, and crowned the DUKE of BRAGANZA their KING, who, supported by *France* and *England*, maintained his Pretensions with Success. The Insurrection at NAPLES was still a Subject of the greatest Uneasiness to *Spain*, heightened by the DUKE of GUISE's having thrown Himself into the Place, from whom They might reasonably expect all the Opposition, that the most ardent Courage, big with the Desire of Glory could inspire. In these Circumstances, vanquished by so great a Number of Misfortunes, and oppressed with so many different Enemies, who seemed all to have conspired to effect the same Design; destitute on the other Hand, of sufficient Armies for the Defence of such Provinces as were attacked, or the Recovery of Those that were revolted, PHILIP IV, resolved to make a Peace, either general, or separate, and sent the Count of Pignaranda, with Orders to this Purpose, as his Plenipotentiary, to *Munster*.

Such

Such were the Circumstances of SPAIN and the UNITED PROVINCES, and such the Disposition of their respective *Sovereigns*, when the Conferences were first opened. I omit to enlarge upon the Interests of the other Powers concerned in this Treaty, as foreign to my Subject. FRANCE, SWEDEN, and the UNITED PROVINCES were closely allied. Differences in RELIGION had kindled a bloody War in GERMANY, where the *Protestants* backed with the *victorious Arms* of Sweden, were every where successful against the *Emperor*, FERDINAND III, *unable from thence* to assist Spain, who was thus left to struggle singly, with all the Difficulties before enumerated. The COURT of MADRID left nothing unattempted to draw off the *French* from their Alliance with the *United Provinces*, by engaging Them in a separate *Peace*; and when this was found in Vain, the same Arts were practised upon the *Dutch*, with better Success. The *Interest* of the *Republic*, seemed to be confined to these few Particulars; that Spain should absolutely renounce all *Right* and *Title* to the *Sovereignty* of the *United Provinces*, and own Them for a free and independant People. Secondly, That their Country should be covered with a good Barrier. And Thirdly, That their Commerce should be secured to Them in the most advantageous Manner

Manner. The First, of these was merely Matter of Form, and easily adjusted, for *Philip III*, in the Truce of 1609, had already treated Them as a *free People*, so that this was only renewing the same Thing with greater Solemnity. The Second, was a Point of more Difficulty. The *Spaniards* had been taught, for a long Series of Years, to consider Themselves as the *first and most powerful Nation* of the *Universe*: fortified in this Opinion, by the great and frequent *Victories* of *CHARLES V*, and enclined naturally to improve, and heighten the favourite *Ideas* They had entertained of their own *Grandeur* and *Superiority*, It was not easy to make Them see their Weakness, and bring Them to Concessions, in Favour of Those whom They had always treated as *rebellious Subjects*. The Third, was still an Article of harder Digestion. Not only *Policy*, but even *common Decency* would scarce allow *PHILIP III*, Lord of both the *Indies*, to confirm the Priviledges granted by the *States General* to the *East-India Company* of *Holland*, and much less to exclude his own *Subjects* from trading within so large a District, as was then in the Dependance of that Company. But the *Dagger* was at his Throat, and the *Necessity* was evident, either of making a *separate Peace* with the *Dutch*, or falling a *Sacrifice* to the *United Arms* of *France*,

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and

and the *Republic*. The first was most eligible in point of Prudence, tho' least conformable to the *vain* Notions of *Honour*, and *false Ideas* of *Greatness*, that then possessed the *Court of Madrid*; and accordingly, after a train of Negotiations, which had been carried on in different Places for near *eight* Years together, a *separate Peace* was at last concluded in 1648, between *Spain* and the *United Provinces*, at *Munster*.

By this Treaty, the King of SPAIN acknowledges the STATES GENERAL, of the *United Provinces*, with the *Countries* and *Towns* on Them depending, to be *free* and *sovereign*; over whom, the said KING renounces all Pretensions for *Himself*, and his *Heirs*, for ever: And thus the *Sovereignty* of the *United Provinces*, was established by the only *Power* that had any Pretension to contest it. By the third Article, the *Barrier* of the *United Provinces*, was secured against *Spain*, by stipulating, that each Party should remain in Possession of all the Places They then held; and particularly, *Bois le duc*, and its Territory, with the Towns of *Mastricht*, *Breda*, *Hulst*, and some others were assigned to the *States*.

The *fifth* Article comes home to our present Subject, by confirming the *Charters* of the

the *East* and *West-India Companies* of *Holland*, and establishing reciprocally the Right of Possession, to either Party, of the Places They then held in the *East* and *West-Indies*, comprehending likewise, all those that the *Portuguese* had taken from the *Dutch* since the Year 1641, which the *King* of *Spain* renounces his Pretensions to, in favour of the *States General*, as also all Lands and Places, which They should conquer, or acquire the Possession of hereafter, without Infraction of the present Treaty.

The *sixth* Article goes yet much further, with respect to the *East-Indies*, and it is very expressly stipulated, That the *Spaniards* shall continue their Navigation in the *East-Indies*, in the manner They had hitherto exercised it, without being permitted to extend it beyond their usual Limits. And the Inhabitants of the *United Provinces*, are prohibited to trade to such Places as were then possessed by the *Castillians*. (a)

As to the *West-Indies*, it was further agreed, in the *seventh* Article, to abstain reciprocally from prejudicing each other's Commerce.

(a) Vide, *Traites de Paix*, en 1648. Tom 3. page 165.

I come now to the State of the Question, between his *Imperial Majesty* and their *High Mightynesses* the *States General*, in behalf of their Subjects, concerning the Right of Commerce, that each Party pretends in both the *Indies*.

The *Dutch India Companies* affirm, that by Virtue of their Charters and Priviledges, confirmed by solemn Treaties, and particularly that of *Munster*, They have an irrevocable Right to trade within certain districts in the *Indies*, exclusively of the *Inhabitants* of the *Austrian Netherlands*, in which Districts, They have constantly exercised that Right, without having been interrupted in it till very lately, by the *Imperialists*, who on the other Hand, deny that any such *Exclusion* is intended by the Treaty of *Munster*; or if it were; that his present *Imperial Majesty* is in any Degree bound by that Treaty, or obliged, in equity, to observe it.

The Words of the Clause in the *sixth* Article, of the Treaty of *Munster*, run thus. ‘ And it hath been further conditioned, and stipulated, *That the SPANIARDS shall retain their Navigation, in such manner, as they hold it at present in the East-Indies, without being permitted to extend it further: As also, the Inhabitants*

of

of the United Provinces, shall abstain from frequenting such Places as are in the Possession of the Castilians.

I think it is incontestable, that these Words convey the Idea of certain Limits, within which, the *King of Spain* ought to confine his Navigation, and Commerce; and the *Dutch Civilians* observe that, there is a very essential Difference in this reciprocal Stipulation; for the *Dutch* engage Themselves only, *not to trade to the Places held by the Spaniards*; whereas, the *King of Spain*, is not only obliged to restrain the Navigation of his Subjects within their *Old Limits*, and prohibit Them the *Dutch District*, but They are likewise excluded all other Places in the Indies, which They had not as yet frequented: and since this Exclusion was condescended to in Favour of the *Dutch*, It is a very natural Consequence, that They must gain what the *Spaniards* lose; so that a vast *Field* is left open to Them; They may extend their Commerce on all Sides; conquer upon the *Portuguese*; and settle in any Part of the *Indies* not occupied by the *Spaniards*, all which They are to possess with an entire Exclusion of all the Subjects of *Spain*. If it be objected that the *Limits* within which the *King of Spain* should confine his Navigation, are not expressed; the

Answer is, that They were perfectly and vulgarly known at the Time of making this Treaty. The *Philippine Islands*, had hitherto been the *non plus ultra* of the *Spaniards*, reckoning from the *Streights of Magellan*, which was the only Course their Ships had kept, or could keep, by Virtue of the *arbitrial Sentence* of POPE ALEXANDER VI; so that the Rest of the *Indies*, from the *Phillippine Islands* to the *Cape of Good Hope*, was left open to the *Hollander*. And this, indeed, agrees very exactly with the 34th Article of the Privileges granted by the *States General* to their *East-India Company*, where it is expressly ordered, ‘ That no Person, of what
‘ Condition or Quality soever, shall presume to Navigate in the *East-Indies*, on
‘ the other Side the *Cape of Good Hope*,
‘ or, by the *Streights of Magellan*, upon
‘ Penalty of forfeiting the Ship and
‘ Cargo.

’Tis now proper to see what the *Imperialists* offer in Support of their *Pretentions*, and how They affect to understand those Articles of the Treaty of *Munster*, that We have now explained.

The First, and indeed, their principal Objection, relates to the last Clause of the 5th Article. The Question is, who are included in the Stipulation of that Clause;
and

and what we are to understand, by the Engagement entred into, by Those whom It shall be found to concern, *to retain their Navigation in the same Manner, that They possess It at Present in the East-Indies, without extending It farther.*

Monsieur Nany, and other zealous Advocates of the *Ostend Company*, press the Letter of the Treaty, and affirm, that as the *Castilians*, or *Spaniards* alone are named, so the Stipulation regards Them only, but does not in the least bind the *other Subjects of Spain.*

But, in Answer to this, the *Imperialists* may be asked, if It be at all uncommon, for all the Subjects of any *Prince*, who has several distinct States, to be designed by the Name of Those that inhabit the most considerable Part of his Dominions. Any one that will give Himself the Trouble of turning over Treaties, may find many Examples of This, and indeed, there is Nothing more common in ordinary Language. In all the Treaties, made between *England* and other States, if every Time the Word *English* is used, It were to be pretended that the Subjects of *Scotland*, and *Ireland*, are not to be understood, or comprehended; this would certainly tend to reverse the Sense and Purport of the clearest Engagements, and open a Door to a thousand Chicanes.

But it will be very easy to demonstrate, from the Nature of the Affair in Question, that the Intention of both the contracting Powers, was to extend what is stipulated concerning the *Spaniards*, or *Castilians*, namely, to all the Subjects of *Philip IV*, indifferently.

It was beyond all Contradiction the Design of the *United Provinces*, to secure to Themselves for the Time to come, a *distinct* and *separate* Right of Commerce, within the Districts of their *India Companies*. The very Difficulties, and Disputes They had met with on this Head, in their Negotiations with *Spain*, for a long Time before the Treaty of *Munster* could be concluded, are a Proof of This. For, if the Question had related barely, to the *quiet Possession* of such Places as the *Dutch* then held in the *Indies*, and the *Liberty of trafficking* with other Nations, and Powers who might be willing to deal with Them, there is not the least Ground to imagine, that *Philip IV*, who passionately desired Peace, and considering the Condition of his Affairs, had abundance of Reason to desire It, would have made so great a Difficulty, of consenting to those Articles that related to the *Indian Commerce*, since This, as I observed just now, had been already granted to Them

Them by his Predecessor *Philip III*, by the Treaty of the *Truce* in 1609. The *Dutch* observe farther on this Head, that the *King of Spain's* Concession, is relative to the Charters of their *India Companies*, which He confirms in all their Extent. 'The
 ' Navigation and Commerce, of the *East*,
 ' and *West-India Companies*, shall be main-
 ' tained according, and in Conformity to
 ' the Charters, on that Head already given, or
 ' that may be given hereafter.' These *Char-
 ters* do not barely confine the two *Compa-
 nies* to the Districts *They then possessed*, with
 the Liberty of trading with other Nations,
 but They exclude from those Districts, de-
 termined by certain Bounds, all the Sub-
 jects of the *united Provinces*; and *Philip IV*,
 in confirming these Charters, ought surely
 to be construed to have confirmed Them
 for all his Subjects.

But in Reality, the *King of Spain's* own
 Interest demanded, that this Confirmation
 should bind all his Subjects of every De-
 nomination. For, after having consented,
 tho' with Pain, to confine the Commerce
 of his best beloved Subjects the *Castilians*,
 within certain Limits in the *Indies*, It can-
 not be imagined that He would make their
 Condition still more disadvantageous, by
 giving his Subjects of the *Low Countries*,
 leave

leave to trade to *India*, either within his own District, or That of the *Dutch*, which must visibly diminish the Profit made by the *Spaniards* or *Castilians*, in whose Favour, both He and his Ancestors had hitherto carefully excluded all their other Subjects from that Commerce, and particularly *Those of the Low Countries*.

There was, indeed, no Necessity, either from the Interest of the *King of Spain*, or the *States General*, to insert the Name of any other People, than That of the *CASTILIANS*, or *Spaniards*, in those Articles of the Treaty of *Munster* that relate to Commerce; because the *Exclusion* of the People of the *Austrian Netherlands*, held valid by all Parties for so long a Time, subsisted still in its full Force; and as it was not expressly revoked or moderated in any Degree, must from thence be construed to be confirmed.

The *Roman Civilians*, and *Grotius*, all agree, that where disputes arise concerning Compacts, the Intention of the contracting Parties, must be examined into. (a) And

(a) Semper in stipulationibus, & in cæteris contractibus, id sequimur, quod actum est, &c. Lib. 34. D. de Reg. Jur.

if it be possible to discover this, the same regard must be paid to it, as if it had been actually expressed. (b) I think it is evident from what has been said, that the *Intention* of *Spain*, and the *United Provinces*, was, that the *Prohibition*, under which, the People of the *Austrian Netherlands* lay, to trade to the *Indies*, should remain in Force: That the *Castilians*, or *Spaniards*, only should be allowed to trade to *India*, within their old *District*; and that all other Subjects of *Philip IV*, of every Denomination, should remain as They were before, utterly excluded from the Commerce in Question.

But the *Imperial Advocates*, do not only attempt to prove, that the *Treaty of Munster*, as far as it relates to Commerce, does not regard the Subjects of the *Austrian Netherlands*: They would willingly understand the Rest of the Treaty in a manner, that I conceive the Words, and natural Sense of it, cannot possibly admit.

‘ All the Demands, says *Monsieur Nany*,
(a) ‘ Of the two *India Companies* of Hol-

(b) Nam in contrahendo, quod agitur, pro Cauto habendum est, Lib. 3. D. de. Reb. Cred.

(a) See la Refutation de Monsieur Nany Sect. 2. Pag. 19

' land, at the *Congress* of *Munster*, went no
 ' further, than to obtain of the KING of
 ' SPAIN, *by way of Sufferance*, the Permis-
 ' sion, and Liberty to navigate and traf-
 ' fick, according to the Tenour of their
 ' Charters. It is surprizing then, adds He,
 ' and shocking to the last degree, to pre-
 ' tend at this time of Day, that the Per-
 ' mission given Them to this purpose,
 ' by his *Catholick Majesty*, may be ex-
 ' tended to the *Exclusion* of those who
 ' were his proper Subjects, in Countries,
 ' where the *States General* did not think
 ' their own Commerce secure, unless the
 ' said *Prince* authorized it, by his Con-
 ' firmation of the above mentioned Char-
 ' ters; which ought to be confirmed by
 ' Him, because they had been granted du-
 ' ring the *War*, and at a time, when the
 ' King of Spain did not acknowledge the
 ' *States General* as free and sovereign, but
 ' considered Them as his Subjects.

It is not easie for the most disinterested
 Person to read this Paragraph of *Monsieur*
Nany's, with common Temper. Sure at the
Treaty of *Munster*, the *States General* stood
 in no need of a *Tolleration*, for their Na-
 vigation and Commerce in the *Indies*, flow-
 ing from the *King of Spain's* Goodness, and
 Condescension. The Face of Affairs was
 very

very much altered since the Truce of 1609, and yet even then, They obtained something more in Point of Commerce, than a precarious Liberty dependant on the *good Pleasure of the Court of Madrid*. The *Sovereignty* of the *States General* was no longer, in the main, a contestable Point, any more than their *Right to trade to the Indies*. They had strengthened Themselves so well, both in one and the other, that *Philip IV*, could not flatter himself, with any probability, of Success in his attempts to deprive Them of either. And indeed, it is evident, from the whole Course of the *Negotiations*, and the Conduct of his *Plenipotentiaries* at *Munster*, that the Views of that *Prince* were confined to the *Preservation* of his own Commerce in *India*, and to hinder the *Dutch* from *Invading* it. Agreeable to this, we find the *Embassadors* of *Spain*, complaining, that the *Dutch* pretended to *tye down their Master*, from carrying his Arms into *Brazil*, to reduce the *Portuguese*, his rebellious Subjects; and from extending his Navigation and Commerce in *India*, to Places out of the *Dutch District*, that were absolutely free and independant. This I apprehend, is something more than a Confirmation of their Charters, and a bare Liberty

Liberty of Traffick, or a Tolleration, as Monsieur Nany expresses it.

Another Argument, equally artificial and frivolous, made use of to evade the force of the Treaty of *Munster*, is this. *Philip IV*, say They, *contracted merely as King of Spain, and Lord of the Indies*; but not as *Duke of Brabant, Count of Flanders, or Sovereign of the other Provinces of the Low Countries.*

It will not be contested, that a *Prince*, who has several *distinct* States, may make a Treaty, which shall regard one of them, and not the other; but the Question is, whether the *King of Spain* treated in that manner, or not. Every Body will allow, that the *Ratification* of the *Sovereign*, is that alone, which gives Force and Sanction, to a Treaty; and in that, which *PHILIP IV*, gave to the Treaty of *Munster*, all his Titles are inserted; *King of Spain; Duke of Burgundy and Brabant; Count of Flanders, &c.* Nor is there any Example to be cited in the whole Treaty it self, that He stipulates, or promises any thing, sometimes under one Title, and sometimes another.

Those who invented this Distinction, may be apt to say indeed, that this is no more than the common stile used in the Preamble of all Treaties; and that no Consequence will arise from It. But there is

a very particular Clause in the Ratification, which leaves no Room to chicanery. ‘ PHILIP
 ‘ IV, declares solemnly, that he approves and
 ‘ ratifies the Treaty, for *Himself*, his *Heirs*,
 ‘ and *Successors*; as also for his *Vassals*, *Sub-*
 ‘ *jects*, and *Inhabitants* of his *Kingdoms*, *States*
 ‘ and *Lordships*, as well in *Europe*, as out
 ‘ of *Europe*, and this, without any *Exception*,
 ‘ in all its *Parts*, and *Contents*, and in each
 ‘ *Point*, and *Article* separately, &c. He o-
 ‘ bliges to this *Purpose*, all and every his
 ‘ *Kingdoms*, *Countries*, and *States*, as also,
 ‘ all his other *Demesns* present, and to come;
 ‘ his *Heirs*, *Successors*, and *Descendants*; so
 that, it would hardly be possible to ex-
 press in stronger Terms, any Engagement
 entered into by a *Prince*, in behalf of all
 his *Dominions*, consisting of various *Pro-*
vinces, by whatsoever Title He may possess
 them. In my Apprehension, therefore, *Phi-*
lip IV, has shut the Door to all immagina-
 ble Exceptions. He obliges all his *Heirs*
 and *Successors*, who shall come after Him,
 in the *Low Countries*, as well as in *Spain*:
 He obliges all his *Vassals*, *Subjects*, and *In-*
habitants, of all the *Countries* of his Do-
 mination in *Europe*, and out of *Europe*,
 without any Distinction: He restrains both
 his *Heirs* and his *Subjects*, whosoever they
 may be, to the observation of all the *Ar-*
ticles

ticles of the Treaty of Munster, in General, and each of them in particular; and as those Articles in question, are the most considerable, it is not to be doubted, that if they were only to bind a part of his Subjects, Care would have been taken to have inserted the Exception.

And thus I think it is evident, that the *true Sense of the Treaty of Munster, and the Intention of the contracting Parties, was to confine the Navigation and Commerce of the Spaniards or Castilians to their old Limits; excluding Them entirely from the Districts of the Hollanders, and all such Places as the Dutch should conquer afterwards, or extend their Commerce to, without Infraction of that Treaty.* And Secondly, That this Exclusion, must bind all the Subjects of his *Catholic Majesty* equally; because, as *Philip IV,* made War upon the Republic of the *United Provinces* both as *King of Spain,* and *Sovereign of the Low Countries,* So he must be considered as the same Person at *Munster,* ratifying the Peace made there, in *Quality of King of Spain, Duke of Brabant, Count of Flanders, &c.* And consequently that the Articles of the Treaty, are *equally binding* to the Inhabitants of all these Countries, under the *common Relation of Subjects, to one and the same Prince.*

After

After having ascertained the Sense and Extent of the 5th and 6th Articles of the Treaty of *Munster*, I come now to examine the other grand Assertion of the *Imperialists*, that supposing the true Sense and Intention of the *Munster Treaty* to be as we explain It, yet the *present Emperor* is not bound by It.

‘ His *Imperial Majesty*, say They, does
 ‘ not possess the *Austrian Netherlands*, as
 ‘ Successor to CHARLES II, late KING of
 ‘ SPAIN, but as One of the Successors of
 ‘ the House of *Burgundy*, in the same man-
 ‘ ner, as his august Ancestors possessed
 ‘ Them before the Accession of PHILIP
 ‘ LE BEL to the Crown of *Spain*.

Here follows what *Monsieur Nany* has advanced to this Purpose, translated *Verbatim*.

‘ Few Persons are ignorant, (a) that
 ‘ the *Netherlands* did never belong to the
 ‘ most august House of *Austria*, as a De-
 ‘ pendance of the Crown of *Spain*, but as
 ‘ Successors of the House of *Burgundy*, whose
 ‘ Dominions They inherited, before They
 ‘ were at the Head of the *Spanish Mo-*
 ‘ narchy, and it was under this Title, that

(a) Refutation de Monsieur Nany. Sect. 8. Pag. 7. 8.

‘ his *most Christian Majesty*, delivered up to
‘ the *States General*, for, and in Eavour
‘ of that most august House, All which,
‘ that Prince, and his Allies, were possessed
‘ of, in those Countries, commonly called
‘ the *Spanish, or Austrian Netherlands*, in
‘ the Month of *April*, 1713, as likewise
‘ the Towns of *Ipres* and *Furnes*, with all
‘ their Dependances ; and it was likewise
‘ in Favour of the *same Title*, that *Mef-*
‘ *sieurs* the *States*, delivered up to his *Im-*
‘ *perial Majesty*, all the Places, Towns, and
‘ Countries, which They had the Admi-
‘ nistration of in his Name, as may be
‘ seen, by the 19th, 20th, and 21st Ar-
‘ ticles of the Treaties of *Radstat* and *Baden*,
‘ and by the two first Articles of the
‘ *Barrier Treaty*, of 1715.

‘ The Stipulations made and provided,
‘ by the several Articles of these Treaties,
‘ evidence in the strongest Manner, that
‘ the *Austrian Netherlands*, are for ever
‘ united to the Dominions of the most au-
‘ gust *House of Austria*, and that the *So-*
‘ *vereignty* and *Property* of Them, are vest-
‘ ed in his *Imperial Majesty*, no otherwise
‘ than as *Sovereign* and *Proprietor* of the
‘ said *Netherlands*, and as *Chief* of the
‘ said *House*, and consequently, in the same
‘ Manner, as his august *Ancestors* possessed
them

‘ them before the Accession of *Philip le Bel*, to the *Crown of Spain*.

From whence, *Monsieur Nany* (a) concludes, That the *Dutch* mistake Themselves, and reason after a very odd manner, ‘ when they say, and repeat continually, that as the *Emperor* is *Heir* and *Successor* of the late *Catholick King*, He is consequently engaged to execute the *Treaty of Munster*, in all its Extent, and oblige his Subjects to observe it.

Another *Advocate* (b) of the *Ostend Company*, who is anonymous, expresses Himself thus. ‘ The *Emperor* possesses those Provinces, in Quality of chief and sole *Heir* of the *House of Burgundy*. And from this incontestable Principle, as He thinks fit to call It, He draws a Consequence very proper for the Cause He undertakes to defend, ‘ That a *King of Spain*, not having it in his Power, by any Treaty or Agreement, to prejudice a Prince who is in his own Right *Heir* to the *House of Burgundy*; Neither the *Treaty of Munster*, nor any Other entered into by *Spain*, can in any Degree, bind his Imperial and *Catholick Majesty*, any further;

(a) Pag. 9.

(b) See Lettre a un Ami en Hollande. a Bruxelles.

' than He may have ratified Them Himself.

If these Gentlemen only pretend, that with Respect to the Treaty of Munster the present Emperor cannot be considered as Heir to the Monarchy of Spain, except in Quality of Successor to the Dominions of the House of Burgundy, amongst which are the Netherlands. This is no new Distinction, but the same that was just now refuted, by which They endeavour to distinguish, between the King of Spain and the Sovereign of the Low Countries; for it is in Quality of Heir to the House of Burgundy, that CHARLES II, succeeded to the Netherlands. But when They ascribe to the present Emperor, a distinct Right, by Virtue of which, He stands exempted from the Observation of any Treaties made by the Kings of Spain, his Predecessors in the Low Countries; and go back as far as MAXIMILIAN I, pretending, that his Imperial Majesty ought to possess the Low Countries, in the same manner, that his august Ancestors did, before the Accession of Philip le Bel to the Crown of Spain; This, if it has any Signification, must mean thus much; that his Imperial Majesty, is immediate Heir to Maximilian I, and not to Charles II, or his Ancestors.

But

But this will be easily refuted, from the best Authorities in History, and the most incontestable Principles of the Law of Nations.

The *Emperor Maximilian I*, having married *MARY*, the *Heiress of Burgundy*, only Daughter to the last *Duke Charles the hardy*, that *Princess* brought Him, by way of Dowry, the seventeen *Provinces of the Netherlands*, and all the other Dominions of the *House of Burgundy*. From hence, it is evident, that *Maximilian* did not possess these *Provinces in his own Right*, which can only be said, of his Son *Philip le Bel*, King of *Spain*, on whom they devolved by *maternal Succession*. And in Conformity to this, we see, that after the Death of *Mary of Burgundy*, *Maximilian* governed the *Low Countries*, only as *Guardian to his Son*.

That *Prince*, then *King of the Romans*, (a) got Himself declared *Guardian* of his Children by the *States of Brabant*; an Example that the *States of Flanders* refused to follow, for as much as depended on Them; and some Years afterwards, in 1488, They chose new *Magistrates at Bruges*, in

(a) Pontus Heuter : *Rer Austriac*, Lib. 2. Chap. 1.

the Name of *Philip*; when *Maximilian* was declared *incapable of the Guardianship of his Son, and his Dominions*; (a) and being afterwards released from his Imprisonment, He swore solemnly, (b) that he acquitted the *States of Brabant* of the Oath they had taken to Him, as *Father and Guardian* of his Son; Five Years after which, *Philip* took the Government upon Himself, (c) and was installed by all the *States of the Low Countries*, in the Presence of his Father, then *Emperor*.

So that, if his present *Imperial Majesty* has no Title to the *Sovereignty of the Low Countries*, but what he draws from *Maximilian I*, it will follow by an undeniable Consequence, that He has no Right or Title to It at all: Since That of *Maximilian*, was only a *Temporary Right*, which He exercised for some time in the Name of his Son *Philip le Bel*, afterwards *King of Spain*. And thus, the zealous *Advocates of Ostend*, by founding Their Master's Right to the *Sovereignty of the Netherlands*, in that of *Maximilian I*, do no more in Reality, than

(a) *Pontus Heuter. Rer. Austriac. Lib. 3. Chap. 3d.*

(b) *Idem, Ibid, Cap. x.*

(c) *Idem, Lib. 5th, Chap. xi.*

rob Him of a good Title, to give Him a bad one.

All Distinctions apart, the short Question is, If the present Emperor be Heir to the last King of Spain, Charles II, or not. He has lately acquired the Sovereignty of the Low Countries, which did not belong to Him before, but to CHARLES II, who was indisputably Chief, and Heir of the House of Burgundy; and one would be apt to esteem it a reasonable Conclusion, that his Imperial Majesty cannot now become such, except in Quality of his Successor.

CHARLES V, Son of PHILIP LE BEL, was he alone, of all the House of Austria, who ever possessed the Dominions of his Family in Germany, and those of the House of Burgundy together. This very Prince was the Person too, that dismembred Them, and united the Low Countries for ever, to the Crown of Spain; assigning at the same time, the Empire, and his Hereditary Dominions in Germany, to his Brother FERDINAND I, and from this time, the German Branch of the Family, was divested of all its Pretentions to the Netherlands. 'Tis true, that these Pretentions were recoverable; but only so, as an Heirship, that might possibly one Day devolve on the Family, by de-

fault of Issue in the Branch of Spain, which, on the other Hand, might have perpetuated itself to the End of the World, and the Posterity of the German Branch in that case must have stood for ever excluded.

To corroborate what has been said, we may appeal to the most solemn and authentic Acts of the *three last Emperors*; Testimonies that will surely find Credit with all the World, preferably to the bold Assertions, and subtle Distinctions, of the *Ostend Advocates*.

By the Declaration of War, published against the *Kings of France, and Spain, Lewis XIV. and Philip V*; by the Treaty of the *Grand Alliance*, and by all the *public Pieces* that have been published in the Name and in Favour of their *Imperial Majesties*, It appears, that they have always avowed Themselves *the sole Heirs of Charles II, last King of Spain, and all his Dominions*.

The beginning of the Treaty of the *Grand Alliance*, runs thus:: ‘ And forasmuch
‘ as the late *King of Spain, Charles the Second, of Glorious Memory*, having left no Issue, his *sacred Imperial Majesty* has
‘ affirmed, that the *Succession of the Kingdoms and Provinces, of the deceased King*,
‘ appertains lawfully to his *august House, &c.*
And the other public Pieces all speak the same Language. Since

Since then, the present *Emperor* is *Heir* and *Successor*, if not in the Whole, yet in Part, to the last *King* of *Spain*, considered as *Duke of Burgundy*, &c. And that it is from the same *Title*, that He derives his *Right* of *Sovereignty* to the *Low Countries*, It will necessarily follow, that He must possess them upon the same Footing, as *Charles II*, did, with all the *Stipulations*, and *Conditions* tied to that *Part* of the *Succession*, which He inherits.

This is a Consequence drawn from the most incontestable, and universally received *Maxims*, of the *Law* of *Nations*, as well as of the *Civil Law*. But let us suppose for a moment, that any other plausible *Title* could be alledged, than *That* of *Succession* to *Charles II*, yet even This will prove Nothing, because his *Imperial Majesty*, when he received the *Sovereignty* of the *Low Countries*, did by the very *Treaty* which secured that *Succession* to Him, give up some of those *Rights*, which, had He been possessed of another *Title*, He might have pretended to.

The 1st *Article* of the *Barrier Treaty* provides expressly, that his *Imperial Majesty* and his *Successors*, shall hold the *Provinces* and *Towns* of the *Low Countries*, in the same Manner, as the late *King Charles II*, of glorious Memory

Memory, *did or ought to have enjoyed Them.* And his *Imperial Majesty* is again particularly engaged by the *26th Article*, to provide and take Care, *That Commerce, and all that depends on It, shall remain, in all and every of its Branches, upon the established Footing; and in the Manner provided by those Articles of the Treaty of Munster, concluded the thirtieth of January 1648, between his Majesty, King Philip IV, of glorious Memory, and the Lords the States General, that relate to Commerce, which Articles are confirmed by the present Treaty.*

If it were necessary to multiply Authorities, to settle the Sense, and Meaning, of the *Munster Treaty*, we might appeal to Custom; and I believe it will weigh extremely with all thinking Men, that the *Dutch*, and after Them the *English*, have enjoyed their Commerce and Navigation in the *Indies*; for above seventy Years, conformably to the true Intent of That, and other subsequent Treaties, without ever meeting with the least Interruption from the People of the *Austrian Netherlands*. In all this Time, there is but one single Instance, that a Subject of the *Spanish Low Countries*, attempted to navigate within the *Dutch Districts*. This was one *Sebastian Brower*, and as soon as It was known at *Batavia*, the *Governour General* gave Orders

ders to the *Captains* of the Company's Men of War, to take *Brower*, which He being informed of, forbore his Voyages. This Man's Attempt, and the Opposition made to Him by the *Dutch*, were both very well known in *Europe*, as well in *Holland*, as at *Madrid*; and the *Dutch Company* approved the Proceedings of their *Governour*, but the *King of Spain* took no Notice of the Affair, which He certainly would have done, had He believed the Conduct of the *Hollanders* unjust, or Inconsistent with the *Treaties* that then subsisted between *Spain*, and the *United Provinces*.

Upon the Whole, I think it may fairly be concluded, that by Virtue of the 5th and 6th Articles of the *Treaty of Munster*, the *Inhabitants* of the *Austrian Netherlands*, are excluded from trading within the Limits prescribed by the *Charters* of the *Dutch India Companies*: That their Condition, in this Respect, is not altered by the Change of Government, in the *Austrian Netherlands*; and that the *Emperor* is bound to hold Them in the same Condition, both as Successor of the last *King of Spain*, *Charles II*, and by Virtue of the *Treaties* He has Himself Personally engaged in.

If any Thing could make void the Stipulations contained in the 5th and 6th Articles

cles of the *Treaty of Munster*, It must either be, that the Things stipulated were contrary to *Justice* and *Equity*, or that *Philip IV*, had not Power by Virtue of the *fundamental Laws* of his *Sovereignty* over the *Low Countries*, to exclude Them from the *Indian Commerce*.

But it is uncontestable that there is Nothing contained in these Stipulations, contrary to *Justice* and *Equity*, unless we suppose that by the *Law of Nature*, and *Nations*, a People cannot lawfully be deprived of the Liberty of trading wherever They please, upon any Account whatsoever. But tho' we extend the natural Liberty that all Men have to Navigation, and Commerce, to the utmost Extent, yet It will be impossible to prove, that this is an *unalienable* Right. There is no Principle in the *Law of Nature* which binds Us not to divest our selves of the Liberty of Navigation and Commerce; or, that obliges Others not to exact a Renunciation from Us, in those Points, by lawful Means, tho' in their own Favour. The Care that every Man is obliged to take of his own Preservation, and of Those that depend on Him, does not enjoin Us, to preserve this Liberty in all its Extent.

The

The vast *Ocean*, indeed, is not the Property of any particular Nation; Nothing is plainer, than that every One is naturally free to sail upon it; nor can it be denied that every Man has a natural Liberty, to negotiate and trade with any Other, that is willing to deal with Him. But what shall hinder *two Princes*, or, *two Nations* from contracting with each Other, that One of Them shall not fit out such and such Ships, or that These shall not Sail further than such a Part of the Ocean; or, into this or that particular Sea, or that They shall not trade to such a particular Place. Of these kinds of Compacts there are a great Number of Examples, and if there were None, It would be impossible to prove that They are either *unjust* or *cruel*, except They reduce One of the contracting Parties, to the Want of such Things as are *necessary for Life*, and could not be procured, unless *by the Commerce or Navigation prohibited*. In this Case the Care of our own Preservation recommended so strongly to every Man by Nature, would bring a just Exception to the Rule.

But if there be *within our own Country*, or *in any other Country*, without the Limits regulated by the Treaty, not only wherewithal to answer the *Necessities and Conveniencies of Life*,

*Life, but likewise to furnish Riches ; can any Thing be less rigorous, than a Clause which should prohibit Navigation to some certain Places ; especially if this Exclusion extends only to very distant Countries, that make as it were a new World to Us. And, indeed, It is sufficient that We renounce, by Agreement, to any Rights We may have had before. The Power of renouncing, and divesting ourselves of such Rights as We may have a Mind to give up, and the Right which Others acquire by such a Renunciation, instead of destroying our natural Liberty, is essential to It, which would otherwise, not only be *unuseful*, but *troublesome* to Us, if we could not *relinquish a Part of our Right*, or the *Practice of It*, upon such Conditions as We thought proper ; or by Way of Exchange for such Conveniences, or Considerations, as may be offered to Us by Others.*

This Renunciation, when it respects a *whole People*, may be made either *directly*, or *indirectly* ; by all Those that are interested, or by Those *who act in their Name*, and are invested with a just Power to restrain Them to the Observation of the Treaty. 'Tis then the very same Thing, as if all in General, and each in Particular, had signed the Articles, and sworn to the Observation of Them. At least, if We pretend not
to

to be bound by such an Ingagement, *tho' It should even be contrary to Our Right*, yet we must be obliged to enter our Protest against It in Time; But if there be no such Thing done, and on the contrary We have submitted our Selves, especially, for a long Time, to the Conditions imposed by the Treaty, We cannot afterwards pretend to exempt ourselves from the Observation of It, upon any Pretext whatever, without a Manifest Violation of the most incontestable Rules of the Law of Nature, and Nations. There is Nothing in which the *Civilians* agree more unanimously than in This. They go so far as even to admit a tacit Renunciation, founded only upon a Man's having neglected, or forborn to urge his Right against Another, who may have possessed Himself of such a certain Navigation, or of a Fishery in any particular Part of the Ocean. (a) Nor are these to be called *Subtilties* or *Evasions* of the *Civil Law*, but reasonable Decisions equally conformable to the *Law of Nature and Nations*. There are a thousand Ex-

(a) Si quisquam in Fluminis publice diverticulo Solus pluribus Annis piscatus sit, alterum eodem uti jure prohibet, Digest. Lib. 44. Tit. 3. De divers. temp. Præscriptionis. Leg. 7.

amples to be given, where a tacit Consent, is acknowledged by all civilized Nations, to have equal Force with the most solemn Conventions; nor can It be contested, without opening a Door to numberless Difficulties, which must produce endless Wars, and Hostilities, to the utter Ruin and Destruction of Mankind.

The Law admits the Force of this tacit Consent, even in Point of Property, between Man and Man. My Neighbour contrives to Bring a Water over my Land to his own, and I see It; He continues the Practice for a long Time, I suffer It; the *Aqueduct* shall then subsist for the Future, without my Consent; and I am fairly deemed to have allowed voluntarily that the Water should take that Course, because I did not hinder It in Time. (a) Then sure, with greater Reason, a *Renunciation* must in It self be lawful, and irrevocable, which is made by an express Convention.

It remains now to enquire, if a *Sovereign* has Power, as such, to oblige his Subjects,

(a) Si Aquam, per Possessionem Martialis, eo sciente, duxisti, Servitutum, Exemplo Rerum immobilium, Tempore quæstisti. Cod. Lib. Tit. 34. de Servitut. & Aqua, Leg. 11.

by Treaty, to abstain from any particular Commerce, by Sea, or Land.

The Power of regulating Commerce between Subjects and Subjects, and between Them and Strangers, has ever been considered as a *fundamental* Right of *Sovereignty*. (a) If this be denied by the *Imperialists*; They may be asked why the *Subjects* of the *Austrian Netherlands*, who have lately attempted a Commerce to the *East-Indies*, thought They had any Need of the *Emperor's Permission*, and whether It was not in that *Monarch's Power to refuse Them*; This will hardly be contested; and had He thought fit to have refused Them, He would in that have exercised an *Act of Sovereignty*, as effectually, as by granting Them his Permission.

A *Prince* may certainly forbid all his Subjects, without Exception, to trade to this, or that foreign Country; and by Virtue of the very same Authority, He may contract with another *Prince*, and engage that his Subjects shall not follow this, or that particular Trade; who,

(a) See *Gasper Zeigler*, de *Juribus Majestatis* Lib. 1. Cap. 41.

upon the Promulgation of such a Treaty, are obliged to abstain from the Commerce interdicted.

But let Us come still nearer to the point in Question, and enquire what Hardship the *People* of the *Low Countries* incur, and what they lose by this *Exclusion* of the *Treaty* of *Munster*. The Answer is, a *Right* of *Navigation*, and *Commerce*, of which hitherto, *they had never made the least use*; but certainly a future *Exclusion* from what they had never yet enjoyed, could be esteemed no great Cruelty: And if it be said, that the *People* of the *Austrian Netherlands*, had voluntarily abstained for so long a time from the *Commerce* in Question; the Consequence will lye against Them, that they had it not very much at Heart: But if, as the Truth is, we say, that the *Prohibitions* of their *Sovereigns* were very stricktly observed, We must likewise own, that the *Continuation* of *those Prohibitions*, could not be called an extraordinary Hardship. He that has lived a long time in the Want of any Thing, may continue the Disuse of it, without any Violence to Himself; and much less are we sensible of the want of that, which we never enjoyed at all.

But if we consider the Circumstances of the *Austrian Netherlands* at the *Treaty* of *Munster*,

Munster, we shall find, that this *Exclusion* must then have carried quite another Face than at present ; and had nothing in it that appeared insupportable. A *greater Interest* than that of *Commerce* pressed Them closely, and demanded, that those People should consent, and agree patiently, *for their own Sakes*, to the Continuation of that, which They had hitherto suffered *from the Commands of their Sovereign*. They were weary, and harrassed with a long War, which They could put an End to, by no other means ; and reduced as they were, there is no Room to doubt, that They would have bought their Peace with the Loss of a *more valuable, and less contestable Privilege*, than that of the *Indian Commerce*, had it been insisted on. Cases of Necessity, like these, will always have their Weight, in spite of common rules, and the most indisputable Privileges. They authorize the *Sovereign*, to give up by Treaty, such Things, as if there was no such necessity, ought never to be dispensed with ; and in these Cases, more than ever, the *tacit Consent* of the People, must be esteemed valid, and equal to the most public and solemn Concurrence.

It is vain, for the *Imperialists* to object, that the *other People of Europe*, are free to
 F f 2 undertake

undertake this Commerce ; the Freedom of others proves nothing in Favour of those who have given up their Liberty.

But to spare my self, and the Reader, the Trouble of citing *Treaties*, and *Examples*, of a *Limitation*, and *Restraint set to the Commerce. and Navigation*, of One of the contracting Parties, I shall close this Part of my Enquiry, with two Citations, from two of the greatest Men of the Age They lived in, whose Authority, Nobody will venture to dispute, GROTIUS, and PUFFENDORF, The first of whom, expresses Himself thus. (a) ‘ Nations, as well as particular Persons, may give up, in Favour of others, not only those Rights which are peculiar to Themselves, but those likewise which are common to Them with the Rest of Mankind.

Monsieur Puffendorf, expresses Himself thus, (b) ‘ No Power can lawfully hinder other Nations, not His Subjects, who may border upon the Ocean, from trading with each other; unless one of these Nations has engaged Herself in his Favour, not to per-

(a) GROTIUS de Jure Belli et Pacis. Lib. 2. Cap. 3. Sect. 16.

(b) De leg, Nat. et Gen. Lib. 4. Cap. 5. Sect. 10.

‘ *mit Another to come and negotiate with*
‘ *Her ; or that This, has not renounced the*
‘ *Right She might have originally to trade*
‘ *with the Other.* Every one is at Liber-
‘ ty to relinquish his Right to whom He
‘ pleases, provided that by so doing, no
‘ Prejudice is done to a third Person. If
‘ an *European People* have acquired a Coun-
‘ try in *Africa*, or the *Indies*, by any Means,
‘ which, according to the received Custom
‘ of Nations, is sufficient to give a good
‘ Title, They may if They please, *abso-*
‘ *lutely refuse the Ports and Commerce of*
‘ *that Country to any other trading People, or*
‘ *permit Them only upon certain Conditions,*
‘ *and under such and such Duties.* This
‘ is practised every Day, and in Rea-
‘ lity I see Nothing in It, that is contrary
‘ to the Law of Nature. For this *Liberty*
‘ of Commerce, which makes so much Noise,
‘ does not prohibit any State from favouring
‘ Her own Subjects, and preferring their In-
‘ terest to that of Strangers.

Thus I think It is made Evident, that
by the 5th and 6th Articles of the Treaty of
Munster, the People of the *Austrian Nether-*
lands, are excluded from all Commerce within
the Districts of the Dutch Companies in *In-*
dia; that the Emperor is obliged to main-
tain that Treaty, both as Heir and Successor

to *Charles II*, late *King of Spain*, and by *Virtue of Treaties, and Conventions*, entered into by *Himself*; and what is still more, that there is no *Cruelty*, no *Hardship*, nor any *Injustice* done to the *People of the Austrian Netherlands*; who, when the *Munster Treaty* was concluded, would doubtless have been glad to have purchased a *Peace*, at a much dearer *Rate*, than the *Continuation of an Exclusion* already imposed upon Them, by their *Sovereigns*.

I come now to examine into the *Consequences* that will naturally arise from the *Prosperity of the OSTEND COMPANY*, and the *Revolutions* that may be expected in *Commerce*, should the *EMPEROR* maintain his *Charter*. But before I enter upon this *Subject* I must desire the *Reader* to cast his *Eye* back to the *Account* we have given of the *ancient State of Commerce in the Austrian Netherlands*, when under the *Government*, of the *DUKES of BURGUNDY*, and *KINGS of SPAIN*, (a) some of whom endeavoured, rather to decrease, than augment It; which will be of *Use* to instruct Us what may be expected from the *Revival*

(a) Part 2. Pag. 258.

of Commerce in those Countries under all the Influence of Royal Favour.

I have already taken Notice of the advantageous Trade the DUTCH have carried on for a long Time past with the *Austrian Netherlands*; and I need not inform the Reader, that should the *Ostend Company* subsist, there must be an entire Stop to the Importation of all *Indian Commodities* into *Flanders*, as well from *England* as *Holland*, with Exception to the *fine Spices*, which are only to be had from the *Dutch*. This is too clear to want any further Explanation. Prohibitions have been made for some Time to this Purpose, and It is self evident, that as *England* and *Holland*, supplied the *Austrian Netherlands* with all the Productions of the *Indies*, before the Establishment of the *Ostend Company*, so the Profits accruing to both the Nations from their *India Trade*, must be lessened in Proportion to the Gains which that Company makes by its Commerce.

But the Loss which the *English* and *Dutch* would sustain from hence, tho' a Point of the greatest Consideration, is far from being the worst They have to expect from the Prosperity of the *Ostend Company*. It must be remembred, that *Bruges*, *Ghent*, *Brussels*, *Mechlin*, and *Antwerp*, all subsist;

with many other large Towns, situated at small Distances, inhabited by an active People, extreamly devoted to Commerce; and as the *Ostend Company's* Charter is formed very much upon the Model of that granted by the STATES GENERAL, to the *Dutch East-India Company*, so Care is taken, that the great Towns of *Brabant* and *Flanders*, like those of the Province of *Holland*, shall all feel an immediate Influence from the *Indian Commerce*. Thus whilst the *public Sales* of the *Company's* Goods are confined to *Ostend* and *Bruges*, the *Charter* directs the *general Assembly* of the *Company*, to be held for the first three Years at *Antwerp*, afterwards at *Ghent* and *Bruges*, and so alternatively, at one of these Places, till the Term of it, which is thirty Years, expires. So that, were the *Company* to subsist, there is an ample Foundation laid for the Revival of the long alienated *Manufactures* and *Fisheries*, that have formerly flourished in these Provinces; to which are added, the *East* and *West-India Trades*, which They never yet enjoyed; and these, I think, must in time, produce a *naval Power*, and a *general Commerce*, equal perhaps, to that which was formerly carried on in *Brabant* and *Flanders*.

It

It requires very little Reflection to see that it is impossible for the FLEMMINGS to become a trading People, without the utmost Damage to the Commerce of *Great Britain* and *Holland*. Should Navigation be revived in the *Low Countries*, and the EMPEROR, with all the assistance of his Allies, ever be able to fit out a *Fleet* strong enough to look the *English* and *Dutch* in the Face, 'tis certain he would attempt to open the *Scheld*; and should this once be done, it is more than probable, that *Antwerp* and *Bruges* will recover from *Amsterdam*, the Trade they formerly lost to Her. This indeed, is a remote Prospect, considering the present strength of the *British Fleet*, and the weakness of the *Emperor* in naval Force: And yet, it may well deserve our Consideration, even at this distance. *Fisheries* are a Nursery for *Seamen*, as *Manufactures* are the Basis of a general Commerce; and if we reflect upon the strange Revolutions that have happened in the maritime Forces of the several Powers of *Europe*, within a short Tract of Time, We shall find that we cannot be too watchful, nor too resolute in our Measures to suppress the Navigation of the *Austrian Netherlands* in its Infancy. In 1588, the *Spanish Fleet* was the
Terror

Terror of *Europe*. *America* and the *Netherlands*, those distant Branches of the *Spanish Monarchy*, were in a Manner joined to the Continent of *old Spain* by the Force of Navigation; yet in little more than threescore Years, this prodigious Power was so reduced, that the *Spaniards* were under the Necessity of hiring *Dutch Vessels*, to carry on their Trade to the *West-Indies*. (a) Few Persons are ignorant from how despicable a Beginning the *Dutch* derive their naval Power. In 1572 They first began to cruise upon the *Spaniard*, with twenty four poor Ships, got together by the Count de la *Marque*, and Commissioned by WILLIAM I. PRINCE of ORANGE; (b) but in 1588, They were able to block up the DUKE of PARMA in the Ports of *Flanders*, by which They had the Honour of concurring with the *English* in the Defeat of the *Spanish Armada*; and in 1610, Sir *Walter Rawleigh*, computed that They had not less than twenty Thousand Vessels, of one Kind or other, in the *United Provinces*. So vast an Encrease of Shipping in the Course of 39 Years, ap-

(a) See *De Wits Memoirs*, Part 2, Page 129.

(b) *Grot. Ann. Lib. 2.*

pears prodigious; yet such are the constant Effects of *Commerce*, in the Hands of an active industrious People. In the Middle of the last Century, the Dominion of the *Narrow Seas* was contested between *England* and *Holland* with Fleets of *one hundred and twenty Sail*, of the *Line of Battle*, on the Part of each Nation, whilst *France* had very few Ships either for *War* or *Traffick*; yet since that Time, we have seen the *French* able to cope with the combined Fleets of *England* and *Holland*, and at the Instant I am writing, *Great Britain* has more effective Ships of *War*, than *Spain*, *Holland* and *France* joyned together.

If we look into the *North*, we shall find the naval Forces of *Sweden* and *Denmark*, reduced to near one Third of what They were formerly; whilst *Muscovy*, which thirty Years ago, had not a single Ship, would now be found equal to the whole joynt Force of all the other Maritime Powers, in the *Baltick*.

I need not say more, to show the Probability of the *Emperor's* acquiring a naval Force, if Trade be suffered to revive in the *Austrian Netherlands*: a Point that deserves the utmost attention of *England*, because there is Nothing the Nation ought to apprehend more than to see *Flanders* in the Hands

Hands of a *Prince* who should at the same Time be powerful at Sea.

The Isles of *Zealand* bar the Entrance, of the *Scheld*, and up higher, the Passage to *Antwerp* is absolutely commanded by the Forts *Henry* and *Lillo*, with some other Garrisons in the Hands of the STATES GENERAL; so that as long as the *Zealanders* continue firm to the *Union*, the Emperor, cannot open the Navigation of this River, without a Superiority at Sea. *Fort Henry*, *Lillo*, and the other Garrisons on the *Main* may be taken, but without being stronger than the *Dutch* in naval Force, It would be impossible to attack *Zealand*. PRINCE MAURICE was so sensible, of the advantageous Situation and Strength of these Islands, that He once told the *States General*, that rather than conclude a shameful Peace, with the *Spaniard*, he would continue the War with the Assistance of the *Zealanders* alone, and had not the *Court of Vienna* now been sensible of the Difficulty of opening the *Scheld*, ANTWERP had certainly been made the chief Seat of their *India Company* from the Beginning. But this Difficulty would vanish in Proportion, as the EMPEROR should grow powerful at Sea, and therefore, It would be Insensibility in *Great Britain* and *Holland*, to sit still and see Him extend his Navigation.

When

When ever his *Imperial Majesty* should find Himself strong enough to execute his Designs, there is no Reason to suppose He would shew more Respect to one Part of the Treaty of *Munster*, than the Other; He would be for driving the *Dutch* entirely out of *Flanders*, and for restoring the Canals of *Sas*, *Swin*, and the other Mouths that open into the Sea, on the side of the *States General*; and then if *France* should so far forget her Interest, as to break the Engagements she is entered into by the Treaty of *Hanover*, or if a civil War, or any other unfore-seen Accident should disable Her from complying with Them, what shall stop the Course of the *Imperial Arms*, or who will be answerable, not only for the *Dutch Flanders*, and the Garrisons of the *States General* in the *Barrier Towns*, but even for the Safety of the *United Provinces*? The same Arguments, by which it is maintained, that the present EMPEROR is not bound by the Treaty of *Munster*, nor Successor to the late KING of SPAIN, CHARLES II, will prove as well, That He is not bound by any Treaty, entered into by his Predecessors, the *Kings of Spain*, since the Accession of *Philip le Bel* to that Crown, and consequently those Treaties, by which the Sovereignty of the *United Provinces* are confirmed, are absolutely

absolutely null and void: All things must return to the State they were in, in the time of MAXIMILIAN I; the *Emperor* is *Lord* of the *United Provinces*, and all Acquisitions that have been since made by any Power whatever, of any Part of the antient Patrimony of the House of *Burgundy*, are all likewise void; we cannot except one any more than the other, and all without Distinction, must return into the *Emperor's* Dependance. Indeed, the Arguments brought to prove this, are manifestly absurd, but Absurdities lose their Quality, when supported by an Army of a hundred and fifty Thousand Men, and if a War should break out between the several Powers engaged in the Treaties of *Vienna* and *Hanover*, it is beyond all doubt, that the *Emperor* would invade the *United Provinces*, under this Title, bad as it is; in which Case, if Success should attend the *Imperial Arms*, ZEALAND, which from the Nature of its situation, must be last attacked, would probably endeavour to avoid the Storm, by making Peace with the Conqueror; and in that Situation, the best she could expect, would be, to be re-united to the *Austrian Netherlands*, and so become a part of the EMPEROR's hereditary Dominions. The *Scheld* is then open,

open, and the *naval Power of Zealand*, at his *Imperial Majesty's Devotion*, to be employed for the Protection, and Encouragement of the Navigation and Commerce of *Antwerp*, and the rest of the *Netherlands*.

The Mischiefs that *England* and *Holland* may apprehend from such a Situation of Affairs are innumerable, and therefore It is certainly the Business of both Nations, by all possible Methods to obviate the Danger. But though the *SCHELD* should never be opened, and the Communication of the *Austrian Netherlands* with the Sea, remain as at present, by *Ostend* and *Nieuport*; yet there is a sufficient Foundation laid for the Revival of *Fisheries* and *Manufactures* in those Provinces, the certain Consequences of which, are *general Commerce*, with a *naval Power*; and It is equally incontestable, that the People of *Brabant* and *Flanders*, cannot enjoy the One, except at the Expence of *Great Britain* and *Holland*; nor that the *EMPEROR* can be Master of the Other, without breaking the *Ballance of Power in Europe*.

I will conclude my Reflections upon this Head, with observing, That the *Austrian Netherlands*, are full as well situated, as either *England* or *Holland*, for making an
Exchange

Exchange of *Commodities* between the *Northern* and *Southern Parts* of *Europe*, and in many *Respects* may hope for much greater *Advantages* in *Points* of *Trade*, under the *Protection* of the *Emperor*, than either *England* or *Holland* can promise *Themselves*, even in the most favourable *Conjuncture*. His IMPERIAL MAJESTY is Master of *Sicily*, *Naples* and *Milan*; and to facilitate a *Correspondence*, or rather to force a *Commerce* between those *Countries* and the *Austrian Netherlands*, He would undoubtedly prohibit the *Importation* of such *Commodities* into *Sicily* and his *Italian States*, either from *England*, *Holland*, or any other *Nation*, as They might be furnished with from *Brabant* and *Flanders*. As He is of very great *Weight* in the *Northern Parts* of *Europe*, He would, probably, find means to conclude a *Treaty* of *Commerce* with the *CZAR* of *MUSCOVY*, by *Favour* of which, His *Subjects* might furnish *Themselves* with the *Commodities* of *Russia*, upon better *Terms* than those of *England* or *Holland*. As He is *Protector* of *Hamborough*, He would certainly be able to facilitate the *Importation* of *Herrings*, and *Salted Fish* of all *Kinds*, from the *Netherlands* into that *City*, as well as *woollen Manufactures*, and other *Particulars*, now furnished
ed

ed by the *English* and *Dutch*, which would be from thence distributed into the different Countries that border upon the *Elbe*. As ARCH DUKE of AUSTRIA, He would prohibit the Commodities of *England*, and *Holland*, in the *Hereditary* Dominions of his Family; and in Quality of EMPEROR, He would be able to influence the Course they have at present in many other Provinces of *Germany*. As his Power should encrease, He would be equally industrious to destroy the Liberties of COLOGNE, and put a force upon the Navigation of the RHINE, as the *Dutch* have hitherto been to preserve both. The same Thing may be expected from Him, with Regard to LIEGE and the Navigation of the MAEZE. And Lastly, As the Dominions of his *Imperial Majesty* are contiguous to those of the OTTOMAN PORTE, It will always be in his Power, by yielding some small Advantages to the TURKS upon the Frontier of *Hungary*, to settle such Conditions of Commerce, both for His *Italian* Subjects, and those of the *Austrian Netherlands*, as will enable them to Trade to SMIRNA, and the other Ports of the GRAND SEIGNIOR'S Dominions, to better Advantage than the rest of *Europe*.

These being necessary Consequences of the *Ostend Company's* Prosperity, the STATES GENERAL must have Recourse to *foreign Alliances* to oblige the *Emperor* to suppress It. But when-ever his *Imperial Majesty* shall content Himself with possessing the *Austrian Netherlands*, upon the Footing prescribed by the *Barrier Treaty* of 1715, their HIGH MIGHTINESSES will be so far from giving Him any Disturbance, that They will always concur in a *defensive Alliance*, for preserving the Succession of those Provinces in the *Imperial Family*, and for securing Them from any Encroachments on the Part of *France*, if that *Crown* should again attempt their Conquest, after the Example of LEWIS XIV, whose Conduct was regulated upon the ambitious Plans of *Richlieu* and *Mazarine*.

A defensive Alliance between the *Emperor* and the *States General*, against *France*, is very advantageous to the *united Provinces*, because It is not only grounded upon a *common Fear*, where the Danger is equally to be apprehended by both the Parties ; but the *Emperor* being first exposed to the Attack, must be the first to perform the Conditions of the *Treaty*: a Point which the *weakest* of the *contracting Powers* ought always to have a special Regard to.

But

But an Alliance with his *Imperial Majesty*, against any Power of the Continent, except *France*, would, in all Probability be useless to the *United Provinces*, because the *Emperor* is too considerable to be attacked by any other of his Neighbours; and were the *States General* engaged in a Quare!, It is very much to be feared, that instead of performing the Conditions of the *Treaty*, in the Quality of a faithful Ally, his *Imperial Majesty* would rather chuse to foment the Dispute, and be pleased to see two inferiour Powers destroy one another, whose Forces being united, might be formidable to Him.





SECT. II.
OF THE
ALLIANCES
OF THE
STATES GENERAL
WITH
FRANCE



THE Animosity which the old
Dukes of BURGUNDY bore
to the Kings of FRANCE,
having been transmitted
with their Dominions, to the
House of AUSTRIA, It was
very natural for the PRINCE of ORANGE,
WILLIAM

WILLIAM I. and the STATES of the UNITED PROVINCES to expect a powerful Assistance from the *French*, to support them in their Revolt against PHILIP II. But the Civil Wars that Distracted *France* during the Reigns of *Francis II.* and CHARLES IX; The detestable Intrigues of KATHERINE DE MEDICIS, and the private Agreement made between the Courts of *France* and *Madrid*, to exterminate the *Protestants* in their several Dominions, were the Causes why the CROWN of FRANCE either could not, or would not give that Assistance to the revolted *Netherlands*; which by all Rules of good Policy, It ought to have done, in order to reduce the exorbitant Power of the House of *Austria*.

HENRY III, who succeeded CHARLES IX, did not understand his Interest better than his Predecessor; but the *King* of *Spain* having broke his Faith with Him in a most treacherous Manner, by supporting the DUKE of GUIZE, and the CATHOLIC LEAGUE, HENRY lent the *Netherlanders* several Sums of Money, and at last, permitted his Brother, the DUKE of ALENCON, to accept the Sovereignty of the *Low Countries*, which was offered Him by the Confederate States; yet the *King* never durst profess Himself the Protector of the *Netherlands*

lands, and by the small Assistance He gave his Brother, his *Majesty* appeared rather to connive at the Undertaking, than approve It. The Truth is, *Henry III*, was so much harrassed by GUIZE, at the Head of the *League* on one Side, and by the *Hugonots* on the other, that he was able to do very little; and to this we may add, that He was both Jealous of *Alencon*, and unwilling to encourage rebellious Subjects.

To this Prince, succeeded the great HENRY IV, who by a long Train of glorious Successes, the Effects of an unparallel'd Valour and Conduct, destroy'd the *League*, broke the Designs of *Philip II*, and restored the *Crown of France* to its former Dignity. This Prince openly declared Himself a Friend to the *United Provinces*, and at one Time might be said to have rivalled QUEEN ELIZABETH in the Friendship and Affection of the *States General*. At least the *Queen* was Jealous of the Alliance formed between the *King* and the *United Provinces* in 1596, by which they engaged to furnish his *Majesty* with four hundred and fifty Thousand *Florins*, for the Service of the ensuing Campaign, and the *King* obliged Himself to attack *Flanders* with a considerable Army, in order to make a Diversion in Favour

vour of the *United Provinces*. (a) But the Peace of *Vervins*, concluded between the Crowns of *France* and *Spain* in 1598, restored Things to their former Situation; the *Dutch* were forced to supplicate *Queen Elizabeth's* Friendship in the humblest Manner, and that politic Princess, made Them pay the Price of their Inconstancy, by obliging the *States* to settle the Debt They owed to *England*, at a Time when They were not in a Condition to Dispute It with Her; which being done, She restored Them to her Favour, and was their Protectrice to the End of her Life: After which, They were again obliged to have Recourse to the *King of France*, who was ever afterwards their faithful Ally.

The Friendship and good Intelligence that subsisted between HENRY IV, and PRINCE MAURICE, was revived in the Reign of his Successor LEWIS XIII, between Prince FREDRIC HENRY, and CARDINAL RICHLIEU, who found a Union of Councils with the *States General*, necessary for

(a) *Grotius Ann. Lib. 10.* Also, *L' Histoire des Provinces Unies, par le Noble, Tom. 2. Pag. 223.*

perfecting his ambitious Schemes for the Elevation of the *French Monarchy*. MAZARINE followed the Example of his Predecessor ; but in Proportion as the Force, and Grandeur of the *Spanish Monarchy* diminished under that of *France*, the Animosity of the *States General* towards the first, gave Place to a Jealousy of the growing Power of the Latter. They were of Opinion that if the *French* should once annex *Flanders* to their Dominions, it would be impossible to hinder Them from conquering the *United Provinces*, when ever they should think fit to attempt It, and in this Fear they concluded a Peace with *Spain*, at *Munster*, in direct Opposition to CARDINAL MAZARINE, who omitted neither Promises nor Threats to prevent It. (a)

Before the Reign of HENRY IV, the *French* subsisted entirely by Agriculture: They had few Manufactures, and little or no Shipping, so that hitherto, the Interests of *France* and *Holland* could not interfere in Maritime Affairs; and the Grandeur

LEWIS XIV, in several Letters to Count de Estrades, styles this Peace, *la Defection des Hollandois*. See D' Estrade's Memoires.

of the *Spanish Monarchy*, which menaced the Kingdom of *France*, as well as the *Republic* of the *United Provinces*, obliged Them to give each other all possible Assistance on the Continent. But when HENRY IV, had concluded the Peace of *Vervins*, and restored the Domestic Tranquillity of his Kingdom, the *French* applied Themselves to Manufactures with a great deal of Industry: The Welfare of Commerce began to be the Care of the *French Cabinet*. RICHLIEU, and MAZARINE, amidst the numberless Intrigues in which They were engaged, had a constant Eye to the trading Interest, and during the Ministry of the Latter, the Manufactures fabricated in *France* were more than all *Europe* could consume.

It is very much to be wondred at, however, that so great a *Genius* as *Richlieu*, should not have extended his Care to the Promotion of Navigation. If the *French*, during his Administration, had begun to export their Manufactures and the several Productions of *France* in their own Ships, they would soon have been too powerful for the Rest of *Europe*, and the Circumstances of that Time, seemed to invite them to the Undertaking. *Richlieu* had broke the Strength of the *Hugonots*, and was Master of the
Coast

Coast, and *Sea-Ports* of the Kingdom; the Naval Power of *Spain* was reduced; The supine Temper of JAMES I, and the Troubles that distracted *England* in the Reign of his Son, left Them no Room to apprehend any Obstruction on the Part of *Great Britain*: And the Alliance of *France*, was hitherto of so great an Importance to the *United Provinces*, that the STATES GENERAL durst not have quarrelled with that Crown upon any Score whatsoever. It must be allowed on the other Hand, that the Arbitrary Government, and Religion of *France*; the light Temper of the Natives, and the false Pride of the Nobility, were all of Them strong Impediments to a general Commerce; and whether CARDINAL RICHLIEU thought Them insurmountable, whether being Himself a Stranger to Commerce, He was unwilling to give any Body else the Credit of performing so great a Work; or, that He postponed the Execution of It in Hopes of a Conjunction still more favourable, I shall not take upon me to determine; but 'tis certain, the Want of *Merchant Ships*, and a *Naval Power*, made the Alliance of the *United Provinces* absolutely necessary to the *French*. During all the Reign of *Lewis XIII*, and for near Thirty
Years

Years of that of his Successor, the Ports of *France* were continually filled with *Dutch Vessels*, which were employed not only in a general Commerce between that Country and the rest of *Europe*, but even in transporting the *French* Commodities from one Part of the Kingdom to another.

CARDINAL MAZARINE saw the Omission of his Predecessor, and would have repaired it, had He not been prevented by the Violence of those Factions that reigned in *France*, during his Ministry. But when He had got the better of his Enemies, and after OLIVER CROMWEL, in compliance with his personal Interests, rather than those of the Nation, had embraced the Alliance of *FRANCE*, and declared War against *SPAIN* in 1655, the Cardinal then fell upon Measures to promote the *French* Navigation, and acquire a naval Power.

I shall make no Scruple to date the Grandeur and Superiority of *France* over the rest of *Europe*, from the Year 1655. 'Tis certain, that before this Year, *France* had never thought it her Interest to quarrel with the *Dutch*, tho' provoked to it by the separate Peace they had made at *Munster*. That *Crown*, on the contrary, had been very careful to cultivate an Alliance with the
United

United Provinces, to prevent their joining with the *Spaniards*, which might prove an Obstacle to the *French Conquests* in *Flanders*; But from the time that CROMWEL declared Himself, *Mazarine*, was so far from being anxious to preserve the Friendship of the *States General*, that He not only obstructed their Commerce by extravagant *Imposts*, but suffered their Merchant-Ships to be attacked by *French Privateers* in the *Mediterranean*; and if we may believe the *Dutch Writers*, the CARDINAL Himself had a considerable share in the Booty. MONSIEUR FOUQUET, *Sur-Intendant* of the *French Finances*, was authorised to establish several Companies, for the *Herring, Cod, and Whale Fisheries*. The KING granted them very great Immunities, and the Importation of *Whale-Fins, and Oyl*, into *France*; was prohibited to all others. Besides this, a Duty of *fifty Sols per Tun* was laid on all foreign Ships, both at their coming in and going out of the Sea-ports of *France*.

The DUTCH, who were far from bearing these Indignities tamely, sent a Squadron of Men of War into the *Mediterranean*, in the latter end of the Year 1666, under the Command of ADMIRAL RUYTER, with Orders to make Reprisals. Their Admiral did his Duty, and took two Ships of
War

War, belonging to the *King of France*, which *Mazarine* had shamefully hired out to serve as *Privateers*, to particular Adventurers, on Condition of receiving one third of the *Prises* that should fall into their Hands. The taking of these Vessels, set the Court of *France* in a flame. *Ruyter* was stiled a *Pyrate*, because in giving Chase to the *French*, he had hoisted *English Colours*, in order to deceive them. 'Twas said, that if the *Dutch* had suffered some losses from *Privateers*, yet they could not charge the *King's Officers* with having done Them any Damage, whereas *Ruyter* had taken two Ships that immediately belonged to his *Majesty*. They said, that so great an Affront could not be attoned for, but by the Blood of Him who was the Author of it ; that the Resentment of the *Crown* should even be extended to the whole *Dutch Nation*, and that *France* ought to declare open War with the *Republic*. This Heat was moderated however, by the *Chancellor Seguir*, and *Monsieur de Villeroi* ; but even these *Lords* could not hinder the *Court* from sending Orders to seize all the *Ships* and *Effects* belonging to the *Dutch*, that should be found in the *Sea-Ports* of *France*.

MAZARINE was encouraged to act in this haughty manner, by a private Treaty, which
He

He had just concluded between his Master LEWIS XIV, and OLIVER CROMWEL, by the 6th Article of which, the PROTECTOR obliged Himself to furnish that *Prince* with a *Squadron of thirty six Men of War*, to cruize upon the *Spaniard* and the *Hollander*. (a)

In the mean Time the *Dutch Minister* at the *Court of France*, received Orders from his Masters, to represent their Astonishment at what had passed, with Relation to the Seizure of the Ships and Merchandize belonging to their Subjects; and on the other Hand Monsieur DE THOU, his *most Christian Majesty's Ambassador* at the *Hague*, was commanded to justify the Procedure of the *French Court*, to require that an exemplary Punishment should be inflicted on the Person of RUYTER, and to complain of the indecent Liberty taken by Monsieur BOREEL; *Embassador of the Republic at the Court of France*, in his Remonstrances to the *French King*, at a public Audience. (b)

(a) In this Treaty the *Protector* is called *invincible*, and the Treaty it self is stiled, *Secretum et inviolabile Fædus*, See the Treaty at large *Recueil des Traitez Tome. 15 p. 709.*

(b) See the Speech of Monsieur de Thou to the *States General* April 1657. *Aitzema Book 37. p. 52.*

The several Memorials and Representations that were made reciprocally by both the Parties, having failed to accommodate the Quarrel, the *States General*, ignorant of the private Treaty concluded between *France* and *Oliver Cromwel*, came at last to very vigorous Resolutions in Behalf of Themselves and their Subjects. It was determined to have a Fleet of *forty eight Sail of Men of War*, which should block up the Ports of *France*, and seize every thing that attempted either to go in or out. All manner of Commerce with *France* was prohibited, and Orders were sent to all the *Sea-Officers* to attack the *French* Ships, where ever they met them. (a) But when the Dye seemed to be cast, and all Men expected to hear of the first Blow being struck, an obliging Letter from the *most Christian King*, to the *States General*, restored the Calm. (b)

It was very natural for the *States* to lay hold of any thing that gave them Hopes of terminating the Dispute by way of Negotiation. The Necessity they were under of having *French Manufactures* to carry on their Trade with other Nations, obliged them to tempo-

(a) *Annales des Provinces unies. Basnage Fol. 489, 490.*

(b) This Letter is dated from *Sedan*, August 15, 1657.
Signed *Lomenie*.

rize ; but it is likewise true, that the ill Usage they received upon this Occasion, first inspired them with the Design of setting up several Manufactures in *Holland*, which had hitherto been peculiar to *France* (a)

The Resolution the *States General* shewed on occasion of this Rupture with *France*, proceeded from an utter Ignorance of the secret Treaty concluded between that *Crown* and *Oliver Cromwel*. Had they been in the least apprized of that Alliance, they durst not have entertained a single Thought of War against two such formidable Powers. On the other Hand, the *French King's* Conduct deserves a Reflection. Either the *Cardinal* was fearful, that the *Dutch Trade* being withdrawn, *France* would not be able to continue the War against *Spain* and the *United Provinces* ; or He was doubtful whether the Conditions of the Treaty he had made with *Cromwel* would be performed ; and perhaps this Suspicion was well grounded. I have already said, that the *Protector* entered into this Alliance with *France*, in Compliance with his *personal Interests*, rather than those of the Nation. It was *Cromwel's* greatest Interest to prevent the

(a) See Part 2d. p. 276.

Restoration of the Royal Family. The *Dutch* were more capable of bringing this about than any other foreign Power, because they alone had a Fleet sufficient to transport an Army, and cover a Descent. But the *Protector* was easy on that side: The short but ruinous War between the *Parliament of England* and the *United Provinces* had shewed the *Dutch* how dangerous it would be to provoke a Man who had the whole Force of *Great Britain* in his Power; and besides this, *De Wit*, was at the head of Affairs in *Holland*; the *Prince of Orange* was excluded from the Honours and Authority which had been enjoyed by his Ancestors, and the Friends of that House, from whom *CHARLES II.* could only hope for Assistance, were discountenanced and out of Employment.

FRANCE and *SPAIN*, were the only remaining Powers from whom the *Royal Family* could possibly receive any effectual Assistance, but neither of them was disposed to afford it. The two Kings on the contrary, strove who should flatter *CROMWEL* most. *Mazarine* offered to buy his Friendship at the Price of *Dunkirk*, when it should be taken from the *Spaniards*, and the *Arch-Duke* who governed in the *Netherlands*, promised to besiege *Calais* and restore it to the *English*, if that might engage him to declare for *Spain*. In these

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Circumstances, perhaps the wisest Course had been to have sat still, and entertained both Sides in Suspence, under Favour of which the Commerce of *Great Britain* could not fail to have flourished. But the *Protector* was not easy at Home. Some of those who had been the Means of his Elevation, either from Envy or a true *Republican* Principle, were become his Enemies; the Nation was accustomed to *War*, and seemed to take Pleasure in it; all which induced *Cromwel* to break with some of his Neighbours, that he might find Employment abroad, for those busy Spirits, which it left at Home, would certainly have engaged in popular Commotions.

Thus the *Protector*, having resolved a *War* from a Motive of self-Interest, the same principle made him prefer the Alliance of *France* to that of *Spain*; because PHILIP IV, was neither so redoubtable an *Enemy* as LEWIS XIV, nor so capable of serving *Cromwel* in the Quality of a *Friend*. The principal Dominions of *Spain* were situated at a great Distance from *England*; and as to the *naval* Power of that *Crown*, which had lately been the Terror of the Universe, It was now so reduced, that when in Consequence of the above-mentioned Treaty, Monsieur DE TURENNE formed the Siege of *Dunkirk* with the confederate Troops of *France* and *England*, a
small

small Squadron of *English* Ships served to block up the Port, and prevent the Garrison from receiving any Relief by Sea. In these Circumstances the *Spaniards* run a very great Risque of having their *Flota* fall into the Hands of the *English*, and to this, we may add, that the ill Condition of their Affairs in the *West-Indies*, gave the *Protector* Hopes of annexing *Hispaniola*, to the Dominions of *Great Britain*.

But this weakness of the *Spaniards*, which invited *Cromwel* into the *War*, and seemed to assure Him of Success, was a very strong reason why He ought not to have broke with Them; because He could not continue to depress the *Crown* of *Spain*, without destroying the *Equality* of *Power*, that ought to subsist between the several great States of *Europe*, and elevating *France* to such an exorbitant Degree, as would enable Her to lord it at Pleasure, over all Her Neighbours.

The *Protector* knew this extreamly well, and there are those who have affirmed, that before his Death, He had taken a Resolution to reconcile Himself to the Court of *Madrid*. (a) After having acquired *Dunkirk*

(a) Monsieur *Wicquesfort*, affirms this to have been the *Protector's* Design; and that one of *Cromwel's* principal Ministers had told him so, in point of Friendship and Confidence. *Wicque Hist. M. S. des Provinces unies, Lib. xi.*

and *Jamaica*, during his Alliance with *France*, He had a mind to possess Himself of *Calais*, by the assistance of the *Spaniards*; but as He did not live to affect this, He left the *French* very great Gainers, by the Measures they had taken with Him.

OLIVER CROMWEL dying in *September* 1658, *Cardinal Mazarine*, thought fit to conclude a Peace with the *Spaniards* in the succeeding Year, by the famous *Pyrenean Treaty*, in consequence of which, LEWIS XIV, was soon after married to the INFANTA, Daughter of PHILIP IV, in whose Right, He afterwards challenged the *Sovereignty* of the *Spanish Netherlands*, tho' in direct Breach of the Renunciations made at his Marriage. By the PYRENEAN TREATY, SPAIN relinquished Her Pretensions to several important Places on the Frontier of *Flanders*, which the FRENCH had hitherto held only by Right of Conquest, and this was such an Accession of strength to the *Crown* of *France*, as enabled Her to give the Law to *Spain* upon all Occurrences; and from this time, the *United Provinces* durst never think of engaging singly in a *War* with *France*, upon any account whatsoever.

After the Conclusion of the *Pyrenean Treaty*, the STATES GENERAL, apprehensive

five of the great Power of the *French Monarchy*, were very earnest with CARDINAL MAZARINE, to renew the Alliances that had subsisted between *France* and the *United Provinces*, before the Peace of *Munster*; and to include Them in the *Pyrenean Treaty* as Allies of that *Crown*. This last, the *Cardinal* easily granted; but for the other, He insinuated to Them, that such a Demand would have been more seasonable before the Peace of the *Pyrenees*; however, He appointed Commissioners to treat with the extraordinary *Embassadors*, which the *Republic* had sent to *Paris* upon this Occasion, but died before the Negotiations were brought to any Conclusion.

Upon *Mazarine's* Death, LEWIS XIV, took the Government of his Kingdom into his own Hands, which brought on the Disgrace of *Monsieur Fouquet*, who was succeeded in the Direction of the Finances by *Monsieur Colbert*.

The *Dutch Ministers* at the Court of *France*, were glad of *Fouquet's* Misfortune, because having been the early Patron, if not the Projector of the *French Greenland-Company*, He thought Himself obliged in Honour to protect it, and this had made Him oppose the *Dutch* with a great deal of obstinacy. The *Embassadors* soon found, however,

however, that *Monsieur Colbert* was not like to be more favourable to Them than his Predecessor. This *Minister* was resolved to do all He could to make the *French Commerce* flourish; and to this Purpose, He was of Opinion, that the Importation of all foreign Manufactures into France, should be prohibited, in order to create a greater Consumption of those that were wrought in the Kingdom; vainly believing the french Manufactures so necessary to the Dutch, and the rest of Europe, that They would be obliged to purchase Them with ready Money.

Thus preposessed, *Colbert* carried Things to so great a length, that the Dutch Ministers prepared to leave France, and return Home, without concluding any Thing. Their Resolution, however, brought Him to a better Temper, and the Chancellor *Seguier*, *Monsieur de Villeroy*, and *Monsieur de Tellier*, being of opinion, that it would be advantageous to France, to renew the Treaties that had formerly subsisted between that Crown and the United Provinces, the Embassadors at last contracted a very important Alliance with Lewis XIV, when they least expected it. (a) By this Convention, all former

(a) Traite d' Alliance et de Commerce: &c. See Traitez de Paix Tome. iv. p. 35.

Treaties between *France* and the *Republic* were confirmed, and the two Nations promised reciprocally to *guarantee* the Possessions of each other. With respect to *Commerce*, Care was taken to prevent *Pyracies*, by forbidding *Privateers* to search any Vessels that they met with at *Sea*, or use the least Violence to their Commanders. Each Nation had full Liberty to enter the *Sea-Ports* of the other, and to trade freely with all sorts of Commodities, except *Whale-fins* and *Oyl*, which the *Dutch* were excluded from bringing into *France*, during the Term of the Priviledge granted to the *Greenland Company*; and as for the above-mentioned Duty of *fifty Sols per Tun*, It was now to be exacted but once, when *foreign Ships* left the *Ports of France*, and those that loaded with *Salt* were liable only to the Payment of one Half. (b) But tho' these Terms were a considerable Abatement of *Monfieur Colbert's* Scheme, yet they were still very severe, compared with the Freedom of *Traffick* the *Dutch* had formerly enjoyed with *France*; nor would the *States General* have acquiesced in such Conditions, had they not obtained at the same Time a very con-

(b) Article separe touchant l' Imposition de cinquante sols par Tonneau sur les Navires Etraugers sortant de *France*.

considerable Advantage in a Point of the utmost Importance to the *Republic*, which was the *Guarantee of France, to their Right of fishing for Herrings on the Coast of Great Britain*. The *French* were very loath to engage Themselves in this *Guarantee*. *Colbert* said, It was unreasonable to expect They should undertake to maintain the *Dutch* in the Enjoyment of a Point that was of a very litigious Nature, and liable to be contested with Them. That the KING of ENGLAND could not but take it extremely ill, and therefore it would be best to couch the Clause of the *Guarantee* in general Terms, to avoid giving Offence to a Prince, for whom both the Nations ought to have the utmost Consideration. But the *Dutch Ministers* knew a general *Guarantee* would be of no Service to their Country, in Case *England* should resolve to dispute the Point, and therefore they insisted strenuously and at last obtained, *that their Right to the Herring Fishery should be particularly expressed*. This Treaty could not be signed however, till the Month of *April 1662*, and the *French King* deferred the Ratification of it some time longer, with a View to engage the *States General*, to include *Dunkirk*, which he had lately purchased of our King *Charles II.* amongst those Places which they were to support Him in the Possession of.

CHARLES

CHARLES II. was restored to the *Crown* of *Great Britain*, in 1660, and might have kept so equal a Ballance between *France* and *Spain*, as would effectually have hindred the former from making further Conquests in the *Netherlands*; and nothing could be more natural, than to expect that Those, who had so just an Abhorrence for the Memory of *Cromwell*, would be the last to fall into his Measures. But unhappily for *Europe*, CHARLES II. had scarce recovered the Throne, when he threw Himself into the Arms of LEWIS XIV, and was more or less influenced by *French* Councils throughout the whole Course of his Reign. I shall be obliged to examine the Conduct of this *Prince*, more particularly in the Sequel. But to return to the Alliance of *France* and the *United Provinces*, the Treaty of 62 being ratified, the *French* published a new Tariff in 1664, which regulated the Duties of Importation in such a Manner, as gave the Merchants of both Nations, a great deal of Reason to hope their Commerce would augment, and be carried on for the Future without Interruption. But a few Years convinced Them of the Vanity of these Hopes. In 1667, the *French Court*, raised the Duties upon foreign Merchandize, in direct Breach of the Treaty

ty of 1662; and in the same Year, LEWIS XIV, executed the Project he had so long entertained, of making Himself Master of the *Spanish Netherlands*. The Rapidity of the *French Conquests in Flanders*, struck a Terror throughout all *Europe*. The KING of FRANCE was accused of aspiring to the *Universal Monarchy*, of breaking the most sacred engagements, and of robbing his Brother-in-Law CHARLES II. of Dominions, to which He had an undoubted Title. In the mean Time, the neighbouring Nations, entered into Measures for checking the Exorbitant Power of *France*, and in 1668, the *Triple League* was concluded between *England*, *Sweden* and the *United Provinces*, which put a Stop to the Arms of *France*, and brought on the Peace of *Aix la Chapelle*, which saved the remainder of *Flanders*; but it was too soon apparent, that the King of *France* entered into this Treaty with no other Intention than that of renewing the War, to more Advantage. The *French* were of Opinion, that if they could but ruin the *United Provinces*, the *Spanish Netherlands* would fall under their Domination, without any Resistance. With this View, LEWIS XIV, losing the Remembrance of all past Alliances, and having first induced the King of *England* to join with Him in the Attack, and
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engaged the *Emperor* in a Neutrality, Invaded the *Republic* of the *United Provinces*, in 1672, and had almost brought It to Destruction, when the *Prince of Orange* being called to the Defence of his Country, acquired the Glory of putting a Stop to the *French Arms*, and of rescuing the Liberties of *Europe*. In 1674 the PARLIAMENT of ENGLAND, jealous of the *French Conquests*, were so importunate with *Charles II.* to break the Measures he had taken in Conjunction with *Lewis XIV.*, that they at last obliged him to make a separate Peace with the *Dutch*, and the *King of Spain*, with great Part of the *Empire*, having at the same Time declared in their Favour, This, in some Measure retrieved the Affairs of the *United Provinces*, and brought on the Peace of *Nimeghen*, in 1678. Whoever peruses this Treaty, will find the *French* were very great Gainers by It; the *Spaniards* entirely lost the *Franche Compté*, and had but a weak Barrier left them in *Flanders*: yet this was so far from satisfying *LEWIS XIV.*, that immediately after the Peace, he set up fresh Claims to several of the most considerable Places in *Flanders*, under the Pretence of *Re-unions*, *Dependancies*, and such Kind of Titles, as are only to be made good by those who have the longest Sword. In short, after refusing to settle the
Limits

Limits between his own Dominions and those of *Spain*, agreeable to the Treaty of *Nimeghen*, He seized upon the *Dutchy* of *Luxemburgh*, and obliged the KING of *SPAIN*, to renounce his Title of *Duke* of *Burgundy*. He observed the same Conduct towards the EMPIRE, by refusing to evacuate several Places agreeable to the Treaties of *Westfalia* and *Nimeghen*; raising Contributions at Pleasure, and obliging the ten Towns of *Alsace*, with the Nobles and *Vassals* of that Country, to swear Allegiance to Him; erecting new Courts of Justice, and forbidding Appeals to the *Imperial Chamber of Spire*. He confiscated the Revenues of the Chapter of *Strasburg*; raised new Fortifications in several Places, dismantled others, and set up Pretentions to the Sovereignty of *Metz*, *Toul*, and *Verdun*, with other Imperial Districts, all which having been complained of in the Diet of the *Empire*, and represented to the *French King*, he was so far from granting Redress, that he invaded the *Palatinate*, surprised *Strasburg* by Treachery, and in order to Grasp the *universal Monarchy*, did all He could either by Fraud or Force, to get the DAUPHIN declared *King* of the *Romans*.

About the same time, in order to make himself Master of *Italy*, LEWIS XIV, bought *Casal* of the Duke of MANTUA, and endeavoured

voured to trick the *Duke* of SAVOY out of his Dominions, who was then but fourteen Years Old, under Pretence of sending Him to LISBON, where he was to marry the INFANTA, and in her Right to enjoy the Crown of *Portugal*.

But these Provocations having given Birth to the League of AUGHSBOURGH, in 1683, between the *Emperor*, the *King* of Sweden, the *States General* of the *United Provinces* and several Circles of the *Empire*, the Direction of whose Forces would be committed to the Care of the *Prince* of Orange, who was indeed the Soul of the *League*; LEWIS XIV, apprehensive of so strong an Opposition, offered the Confederates a twenty Years Truce; which being accepted by them and the *King* of Spain, the *French* remained in Possession of all They had taken from the *Spaniards*, except *Courtray* and *Dixmude*, which they restored to Spain after having slighted their Fortifications.

The Revolution of *England* in 1688, was the Cause of renewing the *War*, and the Success of it entirely broke the *French King's* Measures. The Events of the *War* from *Eighty eight* to the Peace of *Reswick*, and of that which succeeded, between *France* and the several Parties of the *second grand Alliance*, are too recent, and too well known to be inserted here. I shall

shall only observe, that the *War* which the *French King* first declared against the *King of Spain* in 1667, was in effect never put an End to till the Peace of *Utrecht*, in 1713. LEWIS XIV, the principal Personage, was still upon the Scene, and prosecuted his old Quarrel with the same Vehemence, and from the same Motives that induced Him to begin it; which were no less than the Reduction of all the *Netherlands*, and the universal Monarchy of *Europe*, which he believed would be a certain Consequence of the other.

I come now to close this Section with remarking, that a *War* between *France* and *Holland*, would be of very great Prejudice to both the Nations, and cannot possibly produce the least Advantage to either, unless we suppose the *French* strong enough to make the entire Conquest of the *United Provinces*; which it is the Business of all *Europe* to prevent. The *French* would do the *Republic* a great deal of Damage, by seizing such Effects as the *Dutch Merchants* might have in *France*, and by obstructing their Trade with *Men of War* and *Privateers*, especially in the *Mediterranean* and the *Levant*, where the *Dutch* could not maintain such a Squadron as would be able to protect their *Commerce*, except at such an Expence, as the *Finances* of the *Republic*, are by no means equal to at present.

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On the other hand, the *French* would be very great Losers, by being deprived of the *Dutch Trade*. I believe I may affirm, that the Merchants of the four *maritime Provinces*, *Holland*, *Zealand*, *Friezland* and *Groninghen*, take off more than *one Half* of all the *Wine*, and almost all the *Salt* that *France* produces; besides vast Quantities of other Particulars. (a) But should *War* break out between the two Nations, this *Commerce* must consequently cease. The *Dutch* would supply Themselves with *Wine*, from the Banks of the *Rhine*, and the *Moselle*, as well as from *Portugal* and *Spain*, from whence they might likewise bring what *Salt* they had occasion for; unless we should make it their Interest to take it from *England*, by allowing the *Proprietor* so large a *Drawback* upon exported *Salt*, as may enable Him to sell it as cheap as the *Portugueze* or *Spaniards*; and with Regard to the *Fruits* which the *Dutch* now bring from *France*, *Spain* and *Portugal* afford the very same.

A Rupture with *Holland* would be so very destructive to the Commerce and Revenues of *France*, that there is great Reason to believe that *Crown* will never declare *War* against the

(a) See Part 2d. Page 354.

Republic, unless she thinks herself in a Condition to conquer the *seven Provinces* entirely, which is the only thing that can make her amends for the Loss she would sustain from the *Suspension* of her *Commerce*. But to prevent her ever being in that Condition, the STATES GENERAL are obliged by all Rules of *Policy*, to abstain from every thing that may render either the *Emperor*, *England* or *Spain* less redoubtable to *France* than they are at present ; so long as those Powers shall continue in Friendship with the *Republic*.

There is nothing that ought to engage the *States General* in an *offensive Alliance* with *France*, except a *War* with *England* or the *Emperor*. In the first Case, every *Alliance* is to be embraced, and all Means employed to obtain a Peace ; and should his *Imperial Majesty* attack the *Republic*, an *Alliance* with *France* is then desirable, insomuch as it is more eligible to be Servants to the *House of Bourbon*, rather than Slaves of the *House of Austria*.





S E C T. III.
OF THE
ALLIANCES
OF THE
STATES GENERAL
WITH
SPAIN.



Y the Treaty of the *Truce*
concluded at the *Hague*, in
1609, PHILIP III. acknow-
ledged the STATES GENERAL
for Sovereigns of a Free Peo-
ple, after the *Crown* of *Spain*
had treated Them as *Rebels* for thirty
Ii Years

Years together. The Liberty of the *Republic* was confirmed, in a more authentick Manner by the Peace of *Munster*, in 1648; and, such is the Vicissitude of human Affairs, in less than thirty Years after this Treaty, the *States General* were become necessary Allies to *Spain*, and WILLIAM III. Prince of Orange, Great Grandson of WILLIAM I. whom PHILIP II. had proscribed as a Traitor, was now the best Support of the *Spanish Monarchy*, and almost the only Prince whom PHILIP IV, could rely upon, for Defence against the exorbitant Power of FRANCE.

The Dominions of SPAIN, having devolved to the *German Branch* of the *House of Austria*, upon the Death of CHARLES II, and the *Spanish Netherlands*, which rendered their *Catholick Majesties* of very great Consequence to the *United Provinces*, having been separated from that *Monarchy*, and given up to the present EMPEROR; the Interest of the *States General* with regard to the *Crown of Spain*, is no longer what It was, before the *Male Line* of CHARLES V, became Extinct, and whilst the Dominions of PHILIP II, remained united upon one and the same Head. I think it unnecessary therefore, to give any Account of the Alliances that have been formed between
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the *States General* and the *Kings of Spain*, from the Peace of *Munster* to the Death of *Charles II.* most of which were made, with no other View, than to preserve the *Spanish Netherlands* from falling into the Hands of *France*; but I will venture to say, that *Spain* is not become weaker by the Separation of the *Austrian Netherlands*, the Defence of which, had for a long Series of Years, quite drained that Kingdom of Soldiers, and Money.

It is the constant Interest of Trading Nations never to undertake *Offensive Wars*, for the sake of *Glory* and *Conquest*. They must remain upon the *Defensive*, and not come to an open Rupture with their Neighbours, but upon the utmost Necessity. This is a settled Maxim with all Countries, that depend on *Traffick*; and the Nature of the Trade between *Holland* and *Spain* obliges the *States General* to a strict Observation of It towards that Monarchy. But as there is no Rule that is not liable to an Exception, there are certainly some Cases in which It would be the Interest of the *United Provinces*, to declare War against *Spain*, notwithstanding all the Inconveniences which the *Republic* must suffer, from a Suspension of her *Commerce*.

Every Body knows that the Force and Grandeur of *Spain* depends on the annual Returns that she receives from her Colonies in the *West-Indies*, and were the Treasures that are brought from those Countries to remain entirely with the *Spaniards*, They would be more than sufficient to render them what They once were, the most redoubtable Enemies, and most Tyranical Allies in the Universe. But the Incapacity of *Spain*, to furnish a Cargo for the Supply of the *West-Indies*, forces Her to share the Profits of that Commerce with the other Trading Nations of *Europe*; and thus the Return of the *Galleons*, and the *Flotilla*, is as necessary to the Merchants of *France*, *England*, and *Holland*, as to those of *Cadiz* and *Madrid*.

This Poverty, which incapacitates the *Spaniards* to supply the *West-Indies*, arises from Mismanagement in their *European Commerce*. The vast Equipments made by *PHILIP II.* and the ill Success of his Enterprizes, had so totally destroy'd the naval Power of *Spain*, that after the Peace of *Munster*, the *Spaniards* found Themselves obliged to hire *Dutch Vessels*, to carry on their Trade to *America*. The Wars They were afterward engaged in with *France*, the Sums expended in the Preservation of the
Nether-

Netherlands, as well as the *Italian States* dependant on the *Crown of Spain*, the vast Numbers of Men consumed in the Defence of those Countries, from the Peace of *Munster* to the Death of *Charles II*, and the several Calamities which harraßed *Spain* from the *Decease* of this *Prince* to the Peace of *Utrecht*, have been so many invincible Impediments to the Revival of their *Navigation*. Since the Treaty of *Utrecht* They have been zealous to restore their maritime Force, but have been mistaken in the Means. If the Money laid out by the COURT of MADRID in the *Sicilian Expedition*, and the Equipment of that *Fleet*, which was so intirely defeated by our *Admiral*, my Lord TORRINGTON, in 1718, had been employed for the immediate Encouragement of *Navigation*, either in the Nature of *Loans* to particular Merchants, or any other effectual Method for the fitting out *Merchants Ships*, in the several Ports of *Spain*, I believe, that by this Time the *Spaniards* would have been able to carry on their *European Commerce* entirely with their own Ships, and this would in a little Time, enable Them to fit out a *Navy* and to supply their *West-Indies* without the Assistance of any foreign Nation. But the *Spanish Court* was resolved to have a *Fleet* at any Price; before they had laid

the necessary Foundation for its Support; that is, before They had extended Their own Navigation, so as to have a constant *Nursery* for *Seamen*, and before They had a sufficient Quantity of *Stores* in their Country, to repair any sudden Loss, without which It is vain to think of keeping up a *Navy*, except, at such an Expence, as even all the Treasures of the *Indies*, would not be equal to.

It is beyond all Question, the Prime Interest of SPAIN to extend her *Navigation*; but It is likewise the Interest, of almost all *Europe*, and in particular of the *United Provinces*, to suppress It. And tho' it cannot be denied, that the *Spaniards* have a *natural Right* to trade in every Country of *Europe*, and in all other Parts of the World, from whence They have not excluded Themselves by *Compact*, yet I believe, the *Dutch* would not sit still, and see Them carry on the single Trade of the *BALTICK*, in their own Bottoms; because such a Revolution, in that Branch of *Commerce* only, is sufficient to draw on the Ruin of the *Republic*. Nor will this appear strange, if we consider, how many Ships, and how vast a number of Hands the *Dutch* employ in exchanging the Commodities of *Spain*, with those of *Russia*, *Livonia*, *Sweden* and *Norway*, which would then be destitute of Employment: And It is still a
Conf-

Consideration of greater Weight, That without the *Bullion* which *Holland* receives annually from *Spain*, It would be impossible for the *DUTCH* to carry on their Commerce with other Nations, where the *Balance of Trade* is against them; as in the Case of *Muscovy*, *Norway*, *England*, *France*, and the *Levant*. I do not think my self guilty of any Exaggeration therefore, when I say, that a *Revolution* in this single Branch of *Commerce*, would probably draw on the ruin of the *Republic*; and consequently the *STATES GENERAL* would hazard a *War*, rather than to submit to it.

Before the Separation of the *Austrian Netherlands*, from the *Spanish Monarchy*, it was the Interest of the *States General*, that *France* should be formidable to *Spain*, whose Dominions being contiguous to *Holland*, the *DUTCH* had reason to fear, that in a Tide of Prosperity, the *Spanish Court* might be tempted to renew their Pretensions to the *Sovereignty* of the *United Provinces*. But those Fears having vanished, upon the Settlement of the *Spanish Dominions* at the Peace of *Utrecht*, it is now become the Interest of *Holland*, that *Spain* should be formidable to *France*, on the *Continent*; and therefore the *States General* will be faithful Allies to His *CATHOLICK MAJESTY*, so long

long as the latter is contented to let the *European Trade* flow in the same Channel, in which it has run for near a Hundred Years ; and when the *Spaniards* shall endeavour to break the Course, perhaps it may be the Interest of other Nations, as well as the *Dutch*, to frustrate their attempts.



S E C T.



SECT. IV.

OF THE

ALLIANCES

OF THE

STATES GENERAL

WITH

GREAT BRITAIN.



T would have been extreamly difficult, if not impossible, for the DUTCH to have supported their Revolt against SPAIN, and to have settled their Commonwealth, without the Aid of QUEEN ELIZABETH,

ZABETH. The *States* of *Holland* and *Zea-land*, offered Her the Sovereignty of their Provinces, which She thought fit to refuse, for Fear of giving PHILIP II, a Pretence to declare War against Her, at a Time when the Power of *Spain* was a Terror to the Universe; but She assisted the *States*, with Men and Money, and at the same Time exacted *cautionary Towns* from Them, as a Security for her *Reimbursement*, whenever They should be in a Condition to Pay. *English Garrisons* were received into the *Brill*, *Flushing*, and *Fort Rammekins*, which were at once good Security for our Money, and Pledges for the good Conduct and Fidelity, I had almost said, for the Obedience of the *States*, to *England*.

But a very few Years had passed, after *Queen Elizabeth's* Death, when the *Dutch* began to entertain a Jealousy of the *English*, and sent *Embassadors* to KING JAMES I. with Instructions to procure the Restitution of the Three *cautionary Towns*; upon which, Tho' I will not affirm, that *King James I.* could have detained those Places in Point of Right and Equity, after the *States* had offered to reimburse the Money advanced by *Queen Elizabeth*; yet, I will venture to say, He ought to have done it in Point of Interest and Policy.
But

But this *Prince* having rashly engaged his Word to restore Them, when the Sums advanced by *Queen Elizabeth*, should be Paid; OLDEN BARNEVELT, who knew what Importance They were of, went about the Thing so heartily, that in a little Time the Money was raised, and remitted to *England*, upon which KING JAMES ordered the Places to be evacuated. It is pretended, however, That when the *King* made this Promise, he was of Opinion that the *Dutch* could not possibly raise the Money; and finding Himself deceived, He bore a secret Grudge to BARNEVELT ever after, for having outwitted Him. Be this as it will, 'tis certain, He could not have done a weaker Thing; and I dare affirm, that when He abandoned the ELECTOR PALATINE to the Cruelty of the *House of Austria*, He did not do more Mischief to the *Protestant Cause* in general, than the Interest of *England* received by his giving up the Places before-mentioned. Had those Fortresses remained in the Hands of *Great Britain*, the *Dutch* would not have used us so ill, as They afterwards did in the *East-Indies*, and several other Countries. They must have contented Themselves, with such Advantages in Commerce, as constant Application, joined to a rigid Par-

Parfimony would have given Them over us, but they durst not have had Recourse to Fraud and Violence.

KING CHARLES I. knew the Interest of the Nation, with regard to *foreign Affairs*, much better than his Father, as appears from his Design to Succour *Rochelle*, tho' it was ill executed, and from a Passage in *D'Estrades* Memoirs, which, I think, deserves to be particularly taken Notice of. *Count D'Estrades*, the most dexterous, and most successful Negotiator of his Time, was sent to *England*, by CARDINAL RICHELIEU, in 1637, to engage *Charles I.* in a Neutrality, whilst the *French* and *Dutch* should attack the Maritime Towns of *Flanders*; and in his very first Letter to the *Cardinal* after his Arrival at *London*, He gives him an Account of his Negotiation in the following Manner, (a)

***** ' I was very well received
' by the *King* of *England*, whom I addressed conformably to the Orders given
' me by your *Eminency*; and represented

(a) See *D'Estrades's* Memoires, Letter to Card. Richlieu dated Novemb. 24, 1637.

‘ all the Advantages that would naturally
 ‘ accrue to Him from a strict Alliance
 ‘ with the *King*. That not only his *Maje-*
 ‘ *sty*, but all his Subjects would be very
 ‘ considerable Gainers by His complying
 ‘ with our Demands, having the Sea open to
 ‘ Them, and being at Liberty to furnish
 ‘ all Things necessary for the *Kings* Forces,
 ‘ which could not fail to bring a great
 ‘ deal of Money into *England*. That under
 ‘ Favour of the Neutrality which the
 ‘ King ask’d of Him, all the Commerce
 ‘ would be carried on by *English Shipping*,
 ‘ as well for our Armies as those of *Spain*,
 ‘ and even for all the Towns of the *Low*
 ‘ *Countries*. That your *Eminency* had com-
 ‘ manded me to assure Him, you would
 ‘ contribute all that depended on you to
 ‘ maintain a good *Union* and *Friendship* be-
 ‘ twixt his *Majesty* and the *King* of *France*;
 ‘ and even engage the *King* to give Him
 ‘ any Assistance He might stand in need
 ‘ of, from the Attempts of such of his
 ‘ Subjects, as might have ill Intentions a-
 ‘ gainst his Person.

‘ He answered me, That He would do
 ‘ every Thing in his Power to shew the
 ‘ *King* how much He desired his *Friend-*
 ‘ *ship*, provided that what his *Majesty* re-
 ‘ quired of Him, was not prejudicial to his
 ‘ Honour,

‘ *Honour, his Interest, or his Kingdom;*
 ‘ which, he said, must certainly be the Case,
 ‘ if he permitted either the King or the States
 ‘ to attack the Maritime Places on the Coast
 ‘ of Flanders. That in Order to succour
 ‘ Them, He kept a Fleet in the Downs, fit
 ‘ for Action, with fifteen thousand Men, ready
 ‘ to Land in Flanders in case of Need.
 ‘ That He thanked your Eminency for your
 ‘ Offers and Civilities; that He wanted no
 ‘ Assistance to chastise such of his Subjects
 ‘ as should fail of their Duty, *Their Pun-*
 ‘ *ishment being ascertained by his own Autho-*
 ‘ *rity, and the Laws of England.*

An Englishman could not have wished a
 a nobler Answer; and accordingly, upon
 its being transmitted into France, RICH-
 LIEU ordered Monsieur D'Estrades out of
 England, by the very next Post, telling
 Him at the same Time, that before the
 Year came about, the KING of GREAT
 BRITAIN should repent his Stiffness.

The Troubles that ensued in Great Bri-
 tain, during the rest of this unhappy Reign,
 did not give the Court Leave to attend to any
 Thing that passed in the United Provinces;
 wherefore, I shall stay no longer than to
 observe, that had not JAMES I. parted
 with the Cautionary Towns, 'Tis probable
 They would have afforded his Son a safe
 Retreat;

Retreat, in his Extremity; which might possibly have given a Turn to the Affairs of *England*, and have produced an Accommodation.

In 1649, the *Parliament* of *England*, apprehensive that CHARLES II. who then resided at the *Hague*, might have Credit enough, by Virtue of his Alliance with the *House* of *Orange*, to engage the *States General* in Measures for revenging the tragical Death of his Father, thought fit to send *Ministers* to the *Hague*, with Proposals of an *Alliance* between the two *Republicks*. But the *Prince* of *Orange* was then so powerful in *Holland*, that the *English Ministers* could not obtain so much as a public Audience of the *States General*. One of Them, *Doctor Dorislaus*, was Assassinated at the *Hague* by the *Royalists*, and the other was forced to return, without having done any Thing in his Negotiation.

Those who were then at the Head of Affairs in *England*, did not want either Resolution or Inclination to punish the Injury They had received in the Person of *Dorislaus*; but Things not being yet ripe for a Quarrel with the *States General*, the Affront was smothered; and in 1651 the *Parliament* sent a celebrated *Embassy* to

to the *Hague*, with Offers of an Alliance *Defensive* and *Offensive* with the *Republic*. The Death of WILLIAM II, *Prince of Orange*, which happened in the preceding Year, encouraged the *English* to believe their *Ministers* would now meet with a better Reception, than the *Dutch* had given Them in 1649. And, indeed, They were admitted to a public Audience of the STATES GENERAL, and *Commissioners* were nominated to treat with Them, but the Friends of the *House of Orange*, were still so powerful in the *General Assembly*, that notwithstanding all the Endeavours of the *Province of Holland*, which dreaded a Rupture with *England* on Account of her Commerce, the Negotiations were unsuccessful, and the *Embassadors* returned to *England*, without concluding any Thing.

MONSIEUR DE WIT inveighs bitterly against the Friends of the *House of Orange*, for their Behaviour on this Occasion. (a) He affirms, the *English Ministers* offered to renew the *Treaty of Intercourse* concluded in the Year 1495, between HENRY VII, and PHILIP *Duke of Burgundy*, Count of

(a) See *De Wit's Memoires*, Part 3, Page 308.

Holland, &c. by which the *Dutch* would have established their *Commerce* with *England*, upon a very advantageous Footing, and have procured an authentic Act for the Liberty of their Herring Fishery upon the Coast of Great Britain. (a) But with all the Respect that is due to the Authority of *Monsieur de Wit*, there is great Reason to believe, that not even the most zealous Friends of the *House of Orange*, would have been so much byassed by their Respect or Affection for the *Royal Family of England*, as to have refused a Treaty, so very advantageous to their Country. And indeed, it appears by the Account *Monsieur Basnage* has given Us of this Negotiation, that the *English Ministers* did not offer to renew the above-mentioned Treaty.

My *Lord St. John*, at his public Audience, told the *States General*, ‘ That the
 ‘ Alteration of Government which had hap-
 ‘ ned to their State in the foregoing Cen-

(a) *Piscatores cujuscunque Conditionis erunt, poterunt ubique ire, Navigare per Mare, secure piscari absque aliquo Impedimento, Licentia, seu salvo Conductu. See the Treaty of Peace between Henry VII, and Philip Duke of Burgundy, &c. Traitez de Paix, Tome. I, p. 784.*

' tury, had engaged the *English* to assist
 ' Them; and that *England* having now
 ' undergone a Revolution almost Parrallel
 ' to their Own, it was to be hoped, that
 ' the *States*, instead of declaring Them-
 ' selves Enemies to the *new Commonwealth*,
 ' would unite with Her in the strictest
 ' Manner.' And He added, ' That the
 ' two *Republics*, situated, as it were, with-
 ' in sight of one Another, might hold the
 ' Ballance of *Europe*, by joyning their
 ' Forces, whereas, a Misunderstanding
 ' would be fatal, both to their *Commerce*
 ' and *Liberty*, whose Foundations were, as
 ' yet, but ill establisht.' This was the
 Substance of what the *Embassadors* said in
 their Harrangue, and *Monsieur Basnage*
 tells us plainly, that the Commissioners
 nominated by the *States General*, to treat
 with the *English*, were astonish'd to find
 that the *Embassadors* confined Themselves
 to general Propositions, and that They did
 little more, than put into Writing what
 They had spoken before, at their *public*
Audience. (a) *Basnage* says, The *Dutch* dis-

(a) See *Basnage*, *Annales des Provinces Unies*, Fol.
 216.

covered at their first Conference with the *English Ministers*, that CROMWEL had projected the *Union* of the two *Republicks*, as he afterwards explained It, under the Title of *Coalition*; which I have already taken Notice of, and shall examine again in the Sequel. (a) But the *Dutch Commissaries* who had no Thoughts of so strict an engagement, answered in their Turn, with loose and general Promises, of good Intelligence and Friendship; at which the *English Ministers* were so scandalised, upon a Presumption, that the Advances They had made on the Part of *England*, would have been received with more Gratitude, that They resolved to return Home, making the Insults they had received from the ROYALISTS who resided at the *Hague*, a Pretext for demanding their *Audiance*, of *Leave*. And now it was, that the *Dutch* desired in Vain, to make the old Treaty between HENRY VII, and the DUKE of BURGUNDY, the Foundation of a new one. (b) The *Embassadors* declared their Com-

(a) See Part 1. Page 234.

(b) On eut beau leur proposer le Traite d'Entrecours, fait par Philipe, Duc de Bourgogne, Comte de Hollande, &c. avec Henri VII, Roi d'Angleterre pour servir

Commission expired, and that they had Orders to be gone; but some Days after, They demanded another Conference, under the Pretence of having received fresh Instructions from the *Parliament*; at which, They affected to accept of the above-mentioned Treaty, for the *Basis* of their Negotiation, but their Proposals were clogged with so many Difficulties, that it was impossible to bring the Conferences to a good Issue; and accordingly They returned to *London*, without having concluded one single Point.

I have been the more particular in this Account, as It contains two very important Articles. The *first*, is an unquestionable Proof, that *John De Wit*, the greatest Statesman a-

de Fondement & de Base a un nouveau Project. Ils declarerent que leur Commission etoit expiree & qu' Ils avoient Ordre de partir. Ils ne laisserent pas de demander quelque Tems apres une Conference sur la nouvelle Permission, qu' Ils disoient avoir obtenu du Parlement; Ils teignirent d'accepter le Traite d'entrecours & de batir sur le meme principe qu' Ils avoient rejette. Mais Ils firent couler dans leurs Projects, 1. La Necessite de refuser le Secours & la Retraite aux Rebelles & aux Ennemis de la Republique, c'est a dire au Roi d' Angleterre & a toute la maison royale. 2. D'assister le Parlement contre tous ses Ennemis. 3. Enfin, de defendre a la Princesse Royale D' Orange, de rendre a sa Famille les Devoirs, & les Secours, que la Nature & l' Amitie exigeoient d' Elle. *Basnage Annales des Provinces unies*, Fol. 216.

mongst

mongst the *Dutch*, thought the *Revival* of the Treaty between *Henry VII*, and the *Duke of Burgundy*, necessary for assuring the Right of his *Conntrymen* to the *Herring Fishery*. And the *second*, is a fair Avowal, of the *Historian* of the *States General*, that this Treaty was not renewed, and that the Proposition of building a new *Alliance* upon It, did not come from the *English*, as *De Wit* would Insinuate.

Upon the Return of the *Embassadors* to *London*, the *PARLIAMENT*, irritated against the *Dutch*, passed an *ACT* for the *Augmentation of Navigation and Commerce*, by which all foreign Vessels were forbid to bring any Commodities into *England*, except such as were of the proper Growth of the Country to which they belonged; which was in Effect to prohibit the *Dutch Commerce*, a great Part of which, then consisted, as it doth still, in a Transport of foreign Commodities. Such a *Act* could not but be ill received in *Holland*, and accordingly, several Members amongst the *States General*, were of Opinion, that They ought immediately to declare *War* against the *Parliament*; but the Loss of the Battle at *Worcester*, having entirely defeated the Hopes of the Royalists in *England*, and establish'd the Authority of the *Parliament*, the Ma-

jority of the *States General* thought It more Prudent to attempt a Reconciliation by gentle Methods.

Agreeable to This, *Embassadors* were sent to *London*, who arrived there on *Christmas Day 1651*, and were received with a great deal of Civility. The PARLIAMENT gave Them Audience as often as They demanded It, and heard all their Complaints; but instead of Satisfaction, the *English* complained in their Turn of the Assassination of *Doristlaus*, and of the Losses the Nation had sustained from the *Dutch Practices*, in Points of Trade, both in *Muscovy*, *Greenland*, and the *East-Indies*; particularly at *Amboina* and *Banda*. They demanded that all *Ships of War* belonging to the *States General* should strike their Colours to the *English* upon all Occurrences, and that not as a mere Civility, done to a superior Nation, but as a *Respect* and *Hommage* due to the Masters of the *Ocean*; and upon this Principle, the *English* claimed the sole Right of fitting out *Fleets*, of clearing the *Sea* of *Pirates*, and of searching all Vessels, whether *Men of War* or *Merchantmen*, in order to prevent a *contraband Trade*, reserving to Themselves, the faculty of declaring what Species of Goods should be esteemed *contraband*, amongst which, They comprehended

hended *Corn*, the Transport of which, They had a Mind to prevent. They demanded, by way of *Tribute*, the *tenth Herring* of all those that the *Dutch* should take on the Coasts of *Great Britain*: They required likewise the entire Payment of the Money QUEEN ELIZABETH had lent the *States General*, affirming that KING JAMES I, had been imposed upon in that Particular: And lastly, They demanded that Reparation should be made for the Damages the *English* had sustained from the *Dutch* in the *East-Indies*, since the Year 1622, which were estimated at above *two Millions Sterling* the Interest of which amounted to more than the Principal.

It is not consistent with the Conciseness of this Tract, to set down all that the *Dutch Historians* affirm their *Embassadors* to have said in Opposition to these several Pretensions. But upon the whole, The *Dutch* observed, that *Peace* and *Commerce* could not possibly subsist between the two Nations, if the *English* continued their *Piracies*; (a)

(a) 'Twas thus They filed the Enterprizes of two Privateers, to whom the Parliament had granted Letters of Reprisal, for Damages formerly sustained by the *Dutch*.

and They affirmed the *Hollanders* had already lost *thirty Ships* for which no Satisfaction could be obtained, upon their repeated Complaints. The EMBASSADORS likewise, demanded the Repeal of the *Act* for the *Augmentation of Navigation and Commerce*, by way of *Preliminary*. But the *English* would recede from none of their Pretentions. In short, CROMWEL was become Master of Affairs, and had resolved a *War* with the *Dutch*. The STATES GENERAL endeavoured all They could in Honour, to prevent It, and with that View, *Monsieur Nieuport*, Receiver General of *North Holland*, was dispatched into *England*, where he had a great many Friends; But the STATES at the same Time directed their *Embassadors* to oppose the Pretentions of *England* to the *Dominion* of the SEA. They also sent Orders to their *Admiral*, the celebrated TROMP, not to suffer the *English* to search their *Merchantmen* upon any Pretext whatever, and that He might be able to execute their Commands, It was resolved in *Holland*, to fit out a Fleet of one hundred and fifty Sail of *Ships*; Notice of which, was given by the *Dutch Ministers* to the several neighbouring Courts, and particularly to the PARLIAMENT of ENGLAND, who were told, that their High Mightinesses

nesses Fleet was equipped with no other Design, than to keep the *Sea* clear of *Py-rates*, to protect the *Navigation* and *Com-merce* of their Subjects, and to prevent a *Rupture* between the two Nations, by searching and taking their *Merchantmen*. This tacit Reproach animated the *Parliament*, who affirmed that the *Empire* of the *Sea* belonged to *England*, and that They would not fail to maintain It. In short, *Hostilities* were soon after commenced upon the Subject of the *Flag*. *Commadore Young*, having met with a *Dutch Fleet* of *Merchant Ships*, under the Convoy of a Squadron of their *Men of War*, commanded by a *Vice Admiral*, the *English Officer* required the *Dutch* to lower their *Colours*, which being refused, a sharp Engagement ensued, and the *Dutch Admiral* was obliged at last to strike his *Flag*. This Action was soon followed by another of more Importance, between the famous *BLAKE* and *Admiral TROMP*, the Relation of which, may be seen in *Lord Clarendon*, and the other Writers of that Age. (a) My Design does not permit me to relate the Particulars of the *War*, which

(a) This Engagement was fought between *Dover* and *Calais*, in *May*, 1652.

was prosecuted with such Vigour, that in the Compass of eighteen Months, there was no less than *six set Engagements, between the grand Fleets of England and Holland*, besides other Fights and Skirmishes, of small Squadrons, and single Ships.

It is remarkable, That during the Course of this short but ruinous War, the *States General*, or at least, the *States of Holland*, hardly ever discontinued their *Negotiations*, in Order to obtain a *Peace*; and indeed, It is no Wonder They were weary of a Quarrel which exhausted their *Treasury*, and destroyed their *Commerce*.

In the Beginning of the Year 1653, MONSIEUR DE WIT was chosen *Grand Pensionary of Holland*, and distinguished his Entrance upon that Ministry by a Strain of a very extraordinary Nature. The STATES of HOLLAND being assembled, the *Pensionary* exacted an *Oath of Secrecy* from all the Members of that Assembly, and then proposed, that *Holland* should enter into a separate Negotiation with the *Parliament of England*, without the Knowledge or Participation of the other *Provinces*; and having carried his Proposition, the *Provincial States of Holland*, wrote privately to the *Parliament*, and represented in a pathetick Manner the Inconveniencies that each Nation suffered

suffered by a Continuance of the War. DE WIT, was encouraged to take this Step, from an Information He had received of a Misunderstanding between *Oliver Cromwel* and the *Parliament*, who being jealous of their *General*, would be apt to improve this Overture of Peace, in Order to re-trench his Power. But *Cromwel*, who had penetrated *De Wit's* Intention, and was very well acquainted with the Temper of Those He had to do with at Home, was no sooner Master of the *Letter*, the *Secret* of which had been so religiously kept in *Holland*, than he ordered It to be printed and published, with a very insulting Title, (a) representing the *Dutch* as a People *already conquered*; in which he had two Designs, *first*, to sow *Dissention* between *Holland* and the other *Provinces*; and *secondly*, to engage the *English Nation* to desire the continuance of the *War*, which was absolutely necessary for Him, at a Time when He had resolved the Reduction of the *Parliament*, and consequently stood in more need of his Army than ever.

The PARLIAMENT, on the other Hand, surprized at *Cromwel's* Conduct, was in good

(a) The Title was, *The thrice humble Supplication of the States of Holland, who petition the Parliament for Peace.*

Earnest for *Peace*, and not only answered the *Letter* sent Them by the *Province of Holland*, but wrote another to the STATES GENERAL, who were surprized to discover from their *Enemy's Letter*, that the *Province of HOLLAND*, had entered into a *Negotiation* without their *Concurrence*. GRONINGHEN complained loudly against the *States of Holland*, for infringing the UNION, and the other *Provinces* murmured in Proportion to their Inclinations for the House of ORANGE, and the KING of ENGLAND. In the *Parliament's Letter* to the *States General*, They attributed the *War* to the precipitate Retreat of *Monsieur PAUW*, *Embassador Extraordinary* from their *High Mightinesses* to the *Parliament*; but They continued to propose the same Conditions of *Peace*, that *Pauw* had rejected. The *States of Holland* were firm in their Intentions to treat, and proposed that all Hostilities should immediately cease, and be suspended, 'till the *Peace* could be made. But all that the *States General* could be brought to resolve, after very long Debates, was to answer the *Parliament's Letter*, expressing their Desire to treat in a *Neutral Place*, and their Resolutions to send *Plenipotentiaries* thither when It should be agreed on.

What

What Effect this Letter would have had in *England*, is uncertain; for whilst the *States General* were debating at the *Hague*, CROMWEL had turned the *Parliament* out of Doors, and was absolute Master of the Administration. The *Dutch* were in Hopes, however, of reaping some notable Advantage from the intestine Divisions of the *English*, but were disappointed in their Expectations; for whilst *Cromwel* made Himself absolute at Home, He took proper Measures to have a *Fleet*, able to support the Glory of his Arms, and render the Nation formidable to Her Enemies. In the mean Time, to amuse the *States General*, CROMWEL answered the Letter They had wrote to the *Parliament*, professing his Inclinations for the Peace, and his Readiness to Treat in a *Neutral Place*; but He would not deviate from the Plan that had been exhibited to *Monsieur Pauw*, in the foregoing Year. The *States General* on the Contrary, desired to reassume the Project that had been concerted at the *Hague* in 1651, but after some warm Debates in their Assembly, the particular Interest of the *Province of Holland* prevailed, and it was resolved to send *Embassadors* to *London*, with full Powers to treat and conclude the Peace.

During

During these Transactions MONK, had fought the *Dutch Fleet*, and defeated Them in two subsequent Engagements, which so alarmed the *States of Holland*, that They hurried *Monsieur Van Beverning* into *England*, without his Colleagues, whose Equipages were not ready. *Van Beverning* found CROMWEL at the Head of a *Council of State*, composed of the principal Officers of the *Army*, to whom he proposed a Treaty, upon the Plan that had been projected at the *Hague*, in 1651; but *Cromwel* answered him fiercely, that He would not enter into any Negotiation, except under two Conditions: The *first*, That Satisfaction should be made for the Insults offered by *Tromp* to the *English Flag*: And *secondly*, That there should be no Suspension of Arms 'till the Treaty was concluded. But after the Arrival of the other *Embassadors*, CROMWEL, as I have already observed, (a) explained Himself more fully, declaring his Jealousy of the *Dutch Commerce*, and his Opinion that there could never be, a sure and lasting Peace between the two Nations, 'till there

(a) See Part I. Page 234.

should

should be a COALITION of Interests; by uniting Them under one and the same Government.

It is no Wonder, the *Dutch Embassadors* were astonished at so extraordinary a Proposition; which is indeed, from its Impracticableness, a convincing Proof, that how well soever *Cromwel* might understand the Affairs of *England*, yet that He was entirely ignorant of the *interior methods* of Government in the *United Provinces*, as well as of the particular *Disposition* and *Intentions* of the several *Regents* in the *Province of Holland*.

Had CROMWEL consider'd, that all those who compose the Body of the STATES GENERAL, as well as the several Assemblies of the PROVINCIAL STATES; that every BURGO-MASTER, and I had almost said every Member of the several Town-Councils, were really so many Sovereigns; and that They had already conceived the Intention of perpetuating their several Dignities in their own Families; had He known that the Regents of the single Town of *Amsterdam* had many Thousands of Posts in their Disposal, and that the Revenue of that one City, was not less in His Time than 1600000 Pounds Sterling per Annum, all of It submitted to the Management of the same REGENTS, He would have

have immediately concluded It unreasonable, to expect so great a *Disinterestedness* in the Persons concerned, as would be necessary to induce Them to abandon such extraordinary *Priviledges*, and so great a Degree of Power, *where no Equivalent could be offered Them.*

But besides the *Personal* Interest of the *Regents*, That of the *State* in General, was indeed equally repugnant to the projected *Coalition*; and accordingly the *Dutch Embassadors* represented it as a Thing, utterly impracticable, But the Persons they had to do with, were not to be easily persuaded. After having dethroned their *King*, and surmounted innumerable Obstacles, It is no wonder if they thought themselves able to give Law to the *Dutch*, especially after having defeated Them in several Bloody Engagements. Agreeable to this, CROMWEL was so firm in his Demand of the *Union*, that the *Ambassadors* thought fit to detach two of their Body to consult their Principals in *Holland*, and receive fresh Instructions for their Conduct in a Point of so delicate a Nature.

I have already taken Notice that during the absence of these *Ambassadors*, a bloody Engagement was fought btween the *English* and *Dutch Fleets*, in which *Admiral Tromp* was

was kill'd, and *Monk* acquired immortal Honour. (a) This was the last Act of Hostility between the two Nations, during the Time of CROMWEL; for though the *Embassadors* returned with exprefs Orders to reject the *Union* of the two *Republicks*, yet there was an Expedient soon found, that paved the Way to a Treaty. This was the *Exclusion* of the *Prince* of *Orange* from the *Stadtholdership* of the *Province* of *Holland*, the History of which the Reader will remember to have read in the first Part of this Book, to which I refer Him, and will stay no longer, than to observe that CROMWEL'S Acceptation of the *Exclusion* of the young *Prince* of *Orange*, in Lieu of the *Coalition*, is an undeniable Proof, that he demanded the Latter, from a Motive of self Interest; because, I dare affirm, it could not be the Interest of the Nation to abolish the Office of *Stadtholder*. On the other Hand, the Manner in which the Business of the *Exclusion* was conducted in *Holland*, the profound Mystery that was made of It, and the future Conduct of *Monsieur De Wit* towards the *House* of *Orange*, when Crom-

(a) See Part 1, Page 239.

wel was no more, hath made It very probable that *De Wit* Himself, encouraged the *Protector* to insist upon that Demand, and it may be, that He suggested it to Him.

Be this as it will, the *Province of Holland* having engaged by a separate Article, never to have a *Stadtholder*, the *Peace* was concluded at *Westminster*, on the 5th of *April 1654* (a) the principal Conditions of which were as follow, That neither of the two *Republicks* should give Reception, Succour, Protection, or Assistance, to the *Enemies*, or rebellious Subjects of the other; that the Freedom of *Navigation* and *Commerce* should be restored between the two Nations, who obliged Themselves, reciprocally, to defend each other's Ships in case they were attack'd by any other Power; but the Superiority of the *Flag* was entirely yielded to *England*, and the *Dutch Men of War* were to strike their Colours to the *English*, upon all Occasions. The *Republic* of the *United Provinces*, obliged Herself to prosecute and punish the Authors of the *Massacre of Amboina*, if They were yet alive; and to send Commissioners to *London*, to adjust the Disputes of the several *India Companies* of both Nations, and to settle the Amount of the Losses sustained by

(a) See the Treaty at large, *Traitez de Paix*, Tom, 3. p. 647
the

the *English* in the *East-Indies*, *Brazil*, *Muscovy*, and *Greenland*, &c. that Restitution might be made by the *States General*; and if the *Commissioners* appointed by the two Nations should not be able to adjust the Points in dispute, then the Decision of Them was to be left to the *Swiss Cantons*, who were pitched upon for *Arbitrators*. The KING of DENMARK, after a great deal of Difficulty on the Part of *Cromwel*, was included in the Treaty as an *Ally* of *Holland*, the *States General* engaging to make good the Losses that the *English Merchants* had sustained by the Seizure that Prince had made of their Ships in the Port of *Copenhagen*. Lastly, In order to render the *Alliance* firm and lasting, the *States General* promised not to confer the supream Command of their Forces, either by *Sea* or *Land*, upon any Person that would not oblige Himself by *Oath* to an exact Observation of the Treaty.

Thus the Peace was made between the two Nations, which occasioned an extream Joy in the *United Provinces*; insomuch, that several Medals were struck to perpetuate the Memory of an Event so extremely Important to the *Republic*. That of *Amsterdam*, represented *Peace* and *Justice* united together and on Foot, with the se-

veral Symbols proper to each Goddess ; and in the Margin were these Words,

Hæc mihi erunt Artes.

On the Reverse was the following Inscription,

*Quod fælix faustumque sit,
Post atrox Bellum,
Quod inter
Anglicæ Belgicæque Reipublicæ Rectores
Bis frustra tentatis Pacis
Conditionibus, Anno CICI^oCLII exarsit,
In Quo Maximis
Utrunque Classibus sex septentrionali,
Duo Mediterraneo Mari
Pugnata sunt cruenta Prælia,
Dei optimi maximi Beneficio, Auspiciis
Olivarii Magnæ Britannicæ Protectoris,
Fæderati Belgii Ordinum,
Pax cum antiquo Fædere restituta,
Cujus Optimæ,
Rerum in memoriam
Sempiternam Senatus Populusque
Amstelodamensis
Hoc Monumentum fieri curarunt.*

But It is much easier to stipulate the Conditions of an Alliance than to procure the Execution of Them. The STATES
GENERAL

GENERAL were extreamly dissatisfied with the Conduct of *Holland*, and the Exclusion of the PRINCE of ORANGE was so very warmly contested, even among the *States* of that *Province*, that if any Man less able than *Monsieur De Wit*, had been at the Head of the Administration, there is great Reason to believe, *Holland* would not have ratified the Article of the Exclusion. But the Dread They were under of the *English Fleet*, and the total Destruction of their *Commerce*, having at last determined that *Province*, She, by adhering firmly to her own Resolutions, brought over the *States General*; in Consequence of which, the Treaty was ratified and executed in all its Points. The *States* began with paying *nine hundred and fourscore Thousand Florins* for their Ally the KING of DENMARK, by Way of Compensation to the *English Merchants*, for the Ships that had been seized by that *Prince*, at the opening of the War. The next Difficulty was to regulate and to satisfy the Losses sustained by the *English* in the *East-Indies*, in Order to which, the *Dutch* complied very exactly with the Terms of the Treaty, and sent Commissioners into *England* within the limited Time, who agreed to restore the *Isle* of *Poleton*, to make Satisfaction to the Heirs

and Executors of Those who had been Mas-
sacred at *Amboina*, and to furnish *nine hun-*
dred thousand Livres, at two Payments, by
Way of Composition, for all the Pretensions
that *England* might hitherto have against
Them. But notwithstanding all This, CROM-
WEL continued to search their Merchant
Ships, and disturb their *Herring Fishery*. In
Short the *Protector* knew the Superiority of
the *English* over the *Dutch*, and in the Year
before He died, which was in 1658, He con-
tracted the Secret Alliance with LEWIS XIV,
which I have already mentioned under the
Title of *Secretum & inviolabile Fædus*, in
which He engaged Himself to make War
upon *Spain*, and the *United Provinces*, in
Conjunction with *France*, and to divide with
that *Crown* the Conquests that should be
made in the *Netherlands*. But whether this
was his real Intention, or whether, as *Mon-*
sieur Wicquesfort insinuates, He had resolved
a little before his Death, to abandon *France*,
and embrace the Offers of *Spain*, is one
of those Doubts to which History is lia-
ble, and which can never be cleared up.

Upon CROMWEL's Death, the above-
mentioned Treaty remained in Force, and
continued so, 'till after the Restoration,
that a new Alliance was made between
the *States General* and CHARLES II. In
the

the mean Time, RICHARD CROMWEL succeeded his Father in the *Protectorship*; and there cannot be a more convincing Proof of the strong Apprehensions the *Dutch* entertained of OLIVER CROMWEL and the Force of the *English Nation*, than the Compliance 'They shewed to his Son *Richard*, even after he had proved Himself unable to sustain that Building his Father had erected. The *East-India Company* of *Holland*, having seized and confiscated some *English Ships* at *Bantam*, RICHARD ordered his *Resident Downing* to complain of It at the *Hague*, upon which *Downing* having conferred with *Monsieur De Wit*, and settled the Value of the Ships confiscated, at six hundred thousand *Florins*, the *States General*, in their *Legislative Capacity*, commanded their *East-India Company*, to pay that Sum to the Proprietors. (a) A Justice so much the more remarkable, as the Power of that Company is so excessive in the *United Provinces*, that She may well be considered as an overgrown Member, entirely disproportioned to the Body.

(a) *Annales des Provinces Unies*, par *Basnage*, Fol. 575.

CHARLES II, was at *Brussels*, when MONK began to pave the Way for his Restoration, from whence he removed to *Breda* at the Desire of that *General*, and when Things were ripe for His coming into *England*, his *Majesty* resolved to take the *Hague* in his Way, where He paid a Visit both to the STATES GENERAL, and the STATES of HOLLAND, in their several Assemblies; who omitted no *Honours* that might serve to perswade the *King* of their present Respect and Attachment, or efface from his Memory the hard Treatment He had formerly received from Them.

It is not my Business to relate the several Ceremonies that passed on this Occasion. The KING being arrived at the *Hague*, the STATES GENERAL went to compliment Him in a Body, and *Monsieur De Wit*, who was the Mouth of the *Republic*, ended his Harrangue with desiring his *Majesty* to honour the *States General* with his Good Will, and to issue his Orders for negotiating an Alliance that might be the most *intimate*, the *strongest*, and the most *important* of either *State*. In answer to which, the KING assured the *States* of his Resolution to give Them the strongest Proofs of his Esteem and Affection upon all Occa-

Occasions, that He would contract a very close *Alliance* with their HIGH MIGHTINESSES, and that He should envy any other *Prince*, whose Friendship They might set a greater Value upon than His own.

The KING embarked for *England* in June 1660, and tho' the *States General* had already given Him the utmost marks of Respect and Friendship, yet They resolved to send *Embassadors* extraordinary, to the Court of *Great Britain*, who were to renew their Professions, and conclude a fresh Treaty of *Commerce* and *Alliance*. The EMBASSADORS received the same Compliments at *London*, which the *King* had before made to Their Masters at the *Hague*; but when They gave an Account of their Reception, They represented at the same Time, that their Negotiation was like to be long and difficult, and the Success of It very uncertain; because the *Commissioners* appointed to treat with Them, had renewed all the *Difficulties* and *Objections* that had been made in CROMWEL'S Time, before the opening of the War; and that They persisted in their Resolution to conclude an *Alliance*, in which the Advantage would be entirely on the *King's* Side, previously to the Treaty of
Com-

Commerce, which was demanded on the Part of the *States General*.

The Truth is, The Negotiation could not but be extreamly difficult; for it was equally Inconsistent with the Honour of CHARLES II, to suffer the *Alliance* formerly made by CROMWEL, to subsist any longer, or, to contract a new One without improving, or at least without preserving the same Advantages and Pretensions which *Cromwel* had done, in all their Extent. But that which was still more likely to ruin their Negotiation, was, his *Majesty's* Resentment for the ill Usage He had received from Them during his Exile: Notwithstanding all the Compliments that had passed on either Side at the *Hague*, the *King* could never forgive the *States* the Complaisance They had shewn for *Cromwel*, and their cruel and ungrateful Treatment of the young *Prince of Orange* and the *Princess* his Mother, who was his *Majesty's* Sister, and extreamly dear to Him: to which we may add, That the DUKE of YORK, who had a very great Influence over his *Brother*, was an utter Enemy to the *Dutch*; He remembered the Insults He had received at the *Hague*, and long'd to be revenged.

It

It is no wonder therefore, that the *Embassadors* foresaw the Difficulties They were like to meet with in their Negotiation; and if They at last succeeded, it must be certainly attributed to the Necessity of the Times, and the unsettled State of Affairs in *England*, rather than any disposition in the *Court* to keep Measures with the *States General*. CHARLES II, had scarce regained the Throne, when he gave his Subjects the utmost Cause of Discontent, by the Sale of DUNKIRK to the KING of FRANCE; a Bargain, in its own Nature very inglorious for the *Prince*, as well as detrimental to the People, but doubly so, from the Motives that induced the *King* to conclude It, which were the Desire of having a little ready Money, to throw away as he thought fit, and the Assurances He received from *France* of a powerful Protection against any Attempts of his Subjects. The ill Blood that this occasioned, added to the Disputes that reigned in *England*, concerning the *Act of Uniformity*, seemed to threaten an Insurrection on the Part of those who retained a great deal of the old Leaven, and this forced the King, very much against his Inclinations, to enter into a Treaty with the *States General* in September 1662, containing little more than a Renewal of that

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concluded with *Cromwel* some Years before, after It had been executed in every Point, except the Restitution of the *Isle of Peleron*, which the *States* now gave up with a great deal of Alacrity, by Way of Composition for all other Pretensions, which the *English* might have upon Them, for any Losses sustained in the *East-Indies* before the Year 1659. (a) The Article which did the most Honour to *England*, was that of the FLAG, in which the *Dutch* consented to strike their Colours to the *English*; but because this Article was couched in general Terms, and It was not said, that a *Fleet* or *Squadron* belonging to their *High Mightinesses*, should strike to a *Pleasure-boat*, a *Pacquet*, a *Tatcht*, or a *single Man of War*, belonging to the *King of England*; This gave Room to Chicane, and was afterwards the Pretext of a War between the two Nations.

In 1693, CHARLES II, wrote a Letter to the STATES of HOLLAND, in which He told Them, that as it was impossible for Him, who was absent, and at that Distance, to

(a) See the Treaty at large, *Traitez de Paix*, Tome IV. Page 46.

take sufficient Care of the Education of his Nephew, the young *Prince of Orange*, He desired Them to perform that Office conjointly with the *Princess Dowager*; and His Majesty added, that as his Request was an Effect of the great Confidence He placed in Them, their Compliance would be extremely agreeable to Him. (a) But *Monsieur De Wit*, whom the *King* had a Mind to gain by Marks of Confidence, and who was resolved not to be gained, was extremely disconcerted by this Letter; and having consulted his particular Friend, the Count *D'Estrades*, who was then the *French King's Ambassador in Holland*, that Minister represented to Him with a great deal of Prudence, that It was certainly the Interest of the *States*, to undertake the *Guardianship* of the young *Prince*, because They might breed him in such a Manner, as was most consistent with the Good of the *Republic*; and He advised *Monsieur De Wit* to put Himself at the Head of those who should superintend the *Prince's* Education, by which he would have an Opportunity of laying his *Highness* under very great Obligations,

(a) This Letter is dated at *Whitehall*, February the 28th 1663.

by rescuing Him from those Inconveniencies to which he was exposed from the ill Situation of his Affairs, as well as of effacing from his Mind any bad Impressions that He might have received from the *Princess Dowager*. *D' Estrades* added, That He had better make the *Prince* his own, by breeding Him up in a Manner suitable to his Birth, than abandon Him to Others, who would not fail to inspire Him with Sentiments of Revenge, against the Time when He should be able to distinguish the Injury that had been done Him. (a)

This is what Monsieur *D' Estrades* wrote to *Lewis XIV*, and the Event has shewn that He gave the *Grand Pensionary* good Council. But *De Wit* answered, that He was obliged to follow the Opinion of the *Towns* of his *Province*, who He believed were apprehensive of the *Prince's* acquiring too much Power; and the rather, because the People loved Him extreamly. But the Truth is the *Pensionary* was resolved to place his whole Dependance on *Lewis XIV*, and would not trust *Charles II*. in any Respect, tho' that Prince gave Him

(a) *D' Estrades* Memoirs, See his Letter to *Lewis XIV*. February 22. 1668.

the utmost Marks of his Confidence. From all which Monsieur *D' Estrades* thought He had great Reason to conclude, and to acquaint his Master, that the *House of Orange* was entirely Ruined, and that for the Future, It would be in vain to take any Measures, except with the *States*, or, to speak more properly with Monsieur *DeWit*. (a) We may be sure that the *Pensionary* who was all powerful in *Holland*, took Care to inspire the *States* of that *Province* with his own Sentiments ; and accordingly their Answer to *King Charles's* Letter, was dry and formal. They distinguished between the *Prince's Person* and his *Estate*, and promised to take a great deal of Care of his *Lands*, especially those that were situated in *Foreign Countries*, which might be done by giving Orders to their *Embassadors* to act strenuously in his Favour, with the *Kings* of *France* and *Spain*, upon whom his Revenues depended ; but They declared that the *Consideration of past Times and Actions, the Constitution of the Republic and several important Reflections that resulted from thence, would not permit them to go any further.* (b) This An-

(a) See *D' Estrades* Letter to the King, the 22d of March, 1663.

(b) See the Letter of the *States of Holland* to *Charles II.*, dated at the *Hague* April 27, 1663.

swer could not but irritate CHARLES II. and as the Disposition of Monsieur DE WITT and the STATES of HOLLAND towards his Majesty and the HOUSE of ORANGE, are very strongly characterised in the Passages I have just now quoted, from Authorities that are incontestable, This is the Place in which I chuse to distinguish the Motives that might lead CHARLES II. to engage in the War of 1665, which is commonly call'd the *first Dutch War*, from those that induced Him to fall upon the *United Provinces* in 1672.

The *States of Holland* could not have expressed their Hatred of the *Stadtholdership* more effectually than by refusing to superintend the Education of the young *Prince of Orange*, or to joyn their Cares to those of the *King* his *Uncle*, and the *Princess* his *Grandmother* in Order to render Him worthy of the Employments that had been so gloriously excuted by his Ancestors.

But an Aversion for the Concerns and Welfare of the Young *Prince*, was not the only thing to be understood from the Refusal of the *States of Holland*; which implied a great Indifference, if not a Contempt for *Charles II.* and naturally supposed a *Foreign Alliance* and Protection powerful enough to Guarantee the State from the *King of England's* Resentment.

Of

Of all the Powers of *Europe*, FRANCE was the only One, capable of giving the *United Provinces* this Protection, and the *Pensionary* believed He had taken his Measures so well, as to be sure of the Assistance of that *Crown* upon any Emergency. In this dependance, He was not afraid to disoblige the *Uncle* in the *Person* of his *Nephew*; and therefore, If It would have been glorious for *Charles II.* to have restored the young *Prince* of *Orange* to the Dignities of his Ancestors, It must be owned that It was also the Interest of *England*, to break the Cabal that governed the *Province* of *Holland*, and rescue the *Republic* out of the Hands of LEWIS XIV, who from the Partiality of Monsieur *De Wit*, and the Dexterity of his Embassador *D' Estrades*, was in a Manner absolute Master of the *United Provinces*. OLIVER CROMWEL could not bear a Union of Councils between *France* and *Holland*, and tho' the Memory of this Person be justly hateful amongst us in some Respects, yet I am not afraid to adopt some of his Maxims.

CHARLES II. was sufficiently irritated by the Conduct of *Holland*, to have declared War immediately, against the *United Provinces*; but my Lord *Bristol* having impeached the *Earl* of *Clarendon* of

High Treason, the Change that followed upon this at Court, and the Cry that was made for *Uniformity* in Religion, by one Part of the Nation, and for *Toleration* by the other, having divided Men's Affections, and kept the *Parliament* so much employ'd with *Domestick* Affairs, as not to have Leasure to attend to the foreign Interests of the Kingdom; his *Majesty* was obliged to smother his Resentment for the present.

But in 1664, the *Parliament* was no sooner met, than our *East-India Company* presented a Petition, representing the Losses They had sustained from the Enterprizes of the *Dutch* in the *East-Indies*; and this being seconded by other Complaints from the *Royal African*, and *Guinea Companies*, the *Parliament* immediately addressed his *Majesty*, complaining in the Name of all the Merchants of *London*, of the several Insults and Losses They had suffered from the *Hollanders*; which being received by the Court, in such a Manner as served to encrease, rather than suppress their Discontent, the *Parliament's* Resentment became so violent, that when the *King* came to put an End to the Sessions, the *Speaker* recommended to his *Majesty* the Interest of the Nation against *Holland*, and the *Parliament* having

having already settled the necessary Funds, the *City of London* lent the KING a *Million*, for the Service of the *Fleet*.

During the Remainder of the Year 1664, several Hostilities were committed by both Parties on the Coast of *Africa*, which served to heighten their Animosity. The *Dutch East-India Company*, complained in their Turn of the Violencies committed by the *English*; upon which, the *States General* resolved to redress their Grievances; and Things being come to such an Extremity, that War with *England* was no longer to be avoided, They gave the necessary Orders for fitting out their *Fleet*, and putting Themselves into a Posture of Defence: They sent at the same Time, an *Embassador extraordinary* to the *Court of France*, who was ordered to represent the Injustice of the Complaints that *England* made against the *Dutch*, to justify the Conduct of the *States General*, to remind LEWIS XIV, of the Alliance He had lately contracted with Them, and to require his *Majesty* to declare plainly to *Charles II*, that in Consequence of the Engagements He had entered into with the *States General*, He was not only obliged to forbear the Renewal of the Treaty of Friendship which the *King of England* desired with Him, but that He could not even remain in Peace

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with *Great Britain*, if his Majesty broke with the *Dutch*. But the little Success that *Van Beuninghen* met with in his Negotiation, made it plain that either *Monfieur De Wit* was the *Dupe* of *D' Estrades*, or that the Latter was Himself imposed upon by his Master, if He imagined his *Most Christian Majesty* had any Intention to comply with the Engagements he had contracted with the *States General*, according to the Letter of the Treaty.

In the Beginning of the Year 1665 the Hostilities that had been committed for some Time, between the *English* and *Dutch* were authorised by a formal Declaration of War. The Duke of *Tork* put to Sea in Quality of *High Admiral*, and the Grand Fleets of *England* and *Holland*, which consisted of above one hundred Sail of the *Line*, on the Part of each Nation, having met each Other on the 14th of *June*, a memorable Engagement was fought, in which the *Dutch Admiral* blew up, and the *English* obtained a compleat Victory. (a) The *Dutch Fleet* was chased into the Harbours of *Holland*; and had any

(a) See the Particulars of this Fight in the Compleat History of *England*. Also *Burnet's History* of his own Times. And in *Lord Arlington's Letters*.

Man less indefatigable than Monsieur *De Wit* been at the Head of Affairs; It would have been impossible for It to have put to Sea again that Summer. But this Minister was superior to all Difficulties, and having with incredible Industry repaired the Ships, punished a Part of the Officers who had not performed their Duty, rewarded others, and made the famous RUYTER *Lieutenant Admiral* and Commander in Chief, in the Place of Monsieur *Opdam*, He resolved to embark on Board the Fleet, notwithstanding all the Opposition of his Friends, some of whom did not stick to Insinuate that he chose rather to expose Himself to the Hazards of the Sea, than to confront the Dangers that threatned Him at Home, from the ill Temper of the People, exasperated against Him by the ill success of the *Fleet*, and the Love they entertained for the House of *Orange*.

The *English Fleet* had likewise put to Sea again before that of the *United Provinces*, but notwithstanding the Ardour of the Commanding Officers, it was impossible for them to join each other; and after having weathered a violent Storm, They were obliged to return Home without coming to a general Engagement. The *Hollanders* however had suffered infinitely more from the

bad Weather than the *English*, who had taken several *Dutch East-India-Men*, before *Ruyter* could put to Sea; and this had exasperated Monsieur *De Wit* to such a Degree that He prevailed with the *States General* to send out their *Fleet* a third Time, which after having made a Cruize, without meeting that of *England*, which then suffered extreamly from the *Plague* that raged in *London*, and many other Parts of the Kingdom, returned to *Holland*, without doing any Thing memorable.

During the *Winter*, several Negotiations were attempted, in order to procure a Peace; but These not having taken Effect, and the *Parliament*, who were zealous for the War, having voted the *King* 1200000*l.* for the Service of the *Navy*, the *Fleet* put to Sea early in the Year 1666, under the Command of Prince *Rupert* and the Duke of *Albemarle*.

In the mean Time, the *State* of the *United Provinces*, was really deplorable, as is evident from a Passage in *D' Estrade's* Memoirs, which shews the Interior of the *Province of Holland*. LEWIS XIV, thought the *Republic* Powerful, because It was Rich; and happy, because the People paid their Taxes readily. ' Of all the States of Eu-
rope,

‘ rope, says that *Prince*, there goes most Mo-
 ‘ ney into *Holland*; we see a Fleet arrive
 ‘ there every Year, loaden with Merchan-
 ‘ dize to the Value of *two Millions*, which is im-
 ‘ mediately turnned into SPECIE, by the Ne-
 ‘ cessity the Neighbouring Nations are under
 ‘ of having those Commodities, and the Mo-
 ‘ ney is again easily drawn from the Peo-
 ‘ ple, under the colour of *Liberty*. For
 ‘ this Reason, says his Majesty, the Princes
 ‘ of *Orange*, have chosen not to make Them-
 ‘ selves Masters of the State when They
 ‘ might have done It; because whilst They
 ‘ remained only *Generals of the Republic*,
 ‘ They found it very easy under the Pretence
 ‘ of *Liberty*, to drain the Purse of the Peo-
 ‘ ple upon any Immergency; whereas, had
 ‘ They made Themselves Sovereigns, the smal-
 ‘ est Contribution would have past in the Opi-
 ‘ nion of the Populace, for an intolerable
 ‘ Exaction, extorted for the sole Interest,
 ‘ and Advantage of the Prince. (a)

This was his Majestys way of Reason-
 ing, which appears so much the more
 just, as the *Dutch*, after having lost their
Admiral and twenty three Men of War in the

(a) *D' Estrade's Memoires*, See *Lewis XIV's Letter* to
 that Minister, January 1, 1666.

Engagement of 1665, had found the Means to put to Sea again in two Months, with a *Fleet* very little inferiour to the former ; and as the Loss, which the *Province of Holland* sustained a little Time after by the Prize of Her *India Men*, did not hinder Her from furnishing *forty Millions of Livres* for the Service of the *Navy* in the ensuing Year.

But Monsieur *D' Estrades*, who knew the *Republic* much better than his *Master*, expresses Himself thus. ‘ *It is impossible,*
‘ says He, *That Holland can furnish forty*
‘ *Millions more* for the Service of another
‘ Year, without bringing about a *Revolution in*
‘ *the Government.* I have had an Opportu-
‘ nity of being convinced of this more
‘ perfectly within these four Days. That
‘ which made the great Plenty of Money
‘ subsists no Longer ; I mean the *Zeal of*
‘ *the Town of Amsterdam to furnish the*
‘ *necessary Sums,* for the more immediate
‘ Expences of the *State.* Every Man
‘ now Locks up his Money, and those
‘ Millions that are produced by Com-
‘ merce do not circulate as usual. And
‘ tho’ Those who are at the Head of the
‘ Administration, do all They can to con-
‘ ceal this Alteration of Affairs, yet They
‘ are in a great deal of Pain about It, as well
‘ as for the bad Discipline of their *Army*, in
‘ which

‘ which They do not know how to take
 ‘ proper Measures, for want of having a
 ‘ Person sufficiently qualified at the Head
 ‘ of It. The *States* are so jealous of their
 ‘ Authority, and the Title of *Sovereign*,
 ‘ that They chuse to suffer considerable
 ‘ Losses, and turn *Generals* Themselves, ra-
 ‘ ther than employ Those that are capa-
 ‘ ble of that Function. I observe likewise,
 ‘ the ill Effects that will in all Probability
 ‘ follow from the injudicious Assignment of
 ‘ *Winter Quarters*, as well to your *Majesty’s*
 ‘ *Troops*, as to those of the *Republic*; which
 ‘ are dispersed into Places where there is
 ‘ a great Scarcity of *Forage*, and where
 ‘ Provisions are so dear, that both One
 ‘ and the Other run a very great Risque of
 ‘ being starved before the opening of the
 ‘ *Campagne*. I have made very strong Re-
 ‘ presentations of all these Inconveniencies;
 ‘ They confess there wants a Remedy, but
 ‘ the Redress does not follow. (a)

In another Letter to *Monsieur de Lionne*,
 the *Count D’ Estrades* expresses Himself thus.

‘ Permit me to explain my self. When
 ‘ I wrote you word that the *Funds* for

(a) See his Answer to the King’s Letter, Jan. 7. 1666.

‘ the service of this Year, were settled, It
 ‘ was at a Time when all the Towns had
 ‘ given their Consent, and that *Amsterdam*
 ‘ set an Example to the Rest; but now
 ‘ that the opposite *Cabals* do all They can to
 ‘ traverse us, that *Amsterdam* draws in her
 ‘ *Horns*, and that *De Wit’s* Party dimi-
 ‘ nishes every Day, the *Funds* are no
 ‘ longer to be relied on, and the present
 ‘ Administration must certainly fail. The
 ‘ *Assembly* of the *States* of *Holland*, is at
 ‘ present composed of four hundred Persons;
 ‘ I have invited Them to Dinner and *Mon-*
 ‘ *sieur De Wit* has done as much, in Or-
 ‘ der to fix Those that were wavering;
 ‘ but there is a necessity for being al-
 ‘ ways in Action, for if only One or Two
 ‘ Towns should refuse to contribute, the
 ‘ Revolution would soon be universal, be-
 ‘ cause they would certainly be supported
 ‘ by some very considerable Persons in
 ‘ the *State*, who are *Monsieur De Wit’s* Ene-
 ‘ mies. His *Majesty’s* Protection however
 ‘ is of very great Weight to his Party.
 (a) It was impossible to represent the *Re-*
public more justly, and accordingly LEWIS

(a) See his Letter to *Monsieur de Lionne*.

XIV, being convinced of the Capacity and sound Judgment of his *Embassador*, made Answer. ‘ That if the *Republic* was
 ‘ not so powerful as He had imagined Her,
 ‘ She was by much too haughty then,
 ‘ and had done ill to refuse *England* such
 ‘ Terms, as Monsieur *De Wit* ought to have
 ‘ acquiesced in, since He was more sensible
 ‘ of his own Weakness than any Body
 ‘ else.

Such was the State of the *United Provinces*. The Fund necessary for carrying on the War, depended on the Zeal of *Amsterdam*, which was extreamly inconstant ; and the *Grand Pensionary* was forced to rely on the Patronage of the *King of France*, for the support of his Authority ; who did at last declare Himself for the *United Provinces* against *England*. ‘ This is, says His Majesty, *speaking of that Declaration*, a very great step
 ‘ made for the *sole Interest* of the *States*,
 ‘ and almost in every Respect *contrary to my*
 ‘ *own*; GOD send They may remember It, when
 ‘ Time shall serve, with a Suitable Gratitude.
 (a) Yet the Design of this *Prince*, was no more in Reality, than to irritate the two great

(a) Letter from LEWIS XIV, to Count D’ *Estrades*, January 29, 1666.

Maritime Powers of Europe one against the other, in order to destroy their *Commerce* and agrandise his own Dominions at their Expence.

Notwithstanding the ill State of Affairs in *Holland*, Monsieur DE WIT found Means to put to Sea, a Fleet of *eighty three Sail of the Line of Battle*, besides *Frigates* and *Bomb Vessels*, of which *Admiral Ruyter* had the Command, and his Orders were to make Sail towards the *Coast of England*, in order to find the *Enemy's Fleet*. He was also to notify his being at Sea to the Governor of *CALAIS*, in order to hasten the Motions of the *French Fleet*, by Which, agreeable to the Assurances given the *States General* by the *Court of France*, He was to be joyned, but the Event made it plain that *LEWIS XIV*, had no such Intentions.

It would require a Volume to describe the Particulars of the several Engagements that were fought this Year between the *Fleets of England and Holland*. The first Action lasted from the 11th to the 15th of *June*, and during the three first Days, the *English Fleet* was commanded solely by the *Duke of Albemarle*, *Prince Rupert* having been detached with a *Squadron of thirty Ships*, to prevent the imaginary Junction of the
French

French Fleet with that of *Holland*. This Detachment, the Effect of false Intelligence, made the *Dutch* superiour in Force, and gave Them an Advantage in this Engagement, which the *English* repaired before the Summer was over, by the entire Defeat of their Fleet; which having been chased into their very Harbours, occasioned violent Emotions in the several *Towns* of *Holland* and *Zealand*. However, by the extream Diligence of Monsieur *De Wit*, the *Fleet* was repaired, and sent to *Sea* again, before the Summer was over; the *English* also kept the *Sea*; but different Accidents having hindred the *Fleets* from coming up with one another for some Time, and the Season proving very tempestuous, the commanding Officers on either Side, thought proper to retire to their own *Ports*, about the Middle of *October*.

This War cost *England* a great many Lives, and was very expensive; the *Kingdom* had suffered extreamly from the *Plague*, and by the *Fire of London*, thirteen thousand *Houses* had been reduced to Ashes. *Ireland* was rebellious; a Party in *Scotland* had actually taken up Arms upon a Religious Pretext, and had fought the *King's Forces*, by whom They were defeated indeed, but the *Court* had

had still Reason to apprehend fresh Com-
 motions: Upon which, Those who are
 least willing to allow the Constancy and
 Power of the *English*, are forced to confess,
 that a Course of Calamities equal to Those
 which oppressed *Great Britain* at the Junc-
 ture I am treating of, would have been
 Sufficient to have sunk any other Nation.
 Yet the *Parliament* granted the *King* the
 necessary Supplies, with as much Readiness
 as if all had been well; and when the
Swedish Embassadors, amidst their Compli-
 ments to *Charles II*, seemed to insinuate the
 Necessity of making a Peace with *Holland*,
 the *King* Answered, with a Gallantry pe-
 culiar to Him, ‘ That the *Fire* had only
 ‘ consumed a Parcel of *old Houses*, which
 ‘ Time had already ruined, but that They
 ‘ would soon see *LONDON* rebuilt with
 ‘ greater Magnificence; like old *Rome*,
 ‘ when She exchanged her *Mud Walls*, for
 ‘ *Marble*. He added, That the fire had
 ‘ not done so much Mischief as was Ima-
 ‘ gined, the *Citizens* having saved the best
 ‘ of their Effects, but that which vexed
 ‘ Him most, was that the Wind had been
 ‘ contrary for some Days past, and had
 ‘ hindred his *Fleet* from acting against
 ‘ that of *Holland*. I am, said the *KING*,
 ‘ of as good a Family as *Cromwel* at least,
 ‘ and

‘ and therefore, the *States* ought to send
 ‘ me their Deputies hither, as They did to
 ‘ the *Usurper*; and when I know their
 ‘ Pretentions, a Place may be named for
 ‘ holding a *Congress*.

One would have concluded, from this Answer, that his *Majesty* was very well informed, and that knowing his own Superiority, and how much They wanted the Peace in *Holland*, He was determined to make Them buy It at his own Price; but the Event shewed the Contrary. ENGLAND had hitherto carried on the *War* with Honour, and had the *King* entered into a Negotiation immediately after the last Victory, He might certainly have concluded a glorious Peace; but this He fatally omitted, and which is worse, He absolutely neglected to make the necessary Provisions for supporting the *War* with Vigour.

To speak Truth, the Money given by *Parliament* for the Supply of the *Navy*, had been squandered away in loose and voluptuous Pleasures, which reduced the King to accept such a Peace as the *French* thought fit to impose upon Him, by the Treaty of *Breda* in July 1667, after the *Dutch* had visited the *Coasts* of *England* without Opposition, and had made that successful
 Attack

Attack upon our Fleet in the River *Medway*, so much to their own Glory, and the Dishonour of *Charles II.*

The following *Alternative* proposed by the *Court of France*, was the Foundation of that *PEACE of BREDA*. *Either that both Parties should make a general and reciprocal Restitution of all that They had taken from each other during the War, or keep what they were possessed of, and annihilate all further Pretensions.* The latter of the two was chosen, as being the surest, and least liable to Exception, by Virtue of which the *Isle of Poloron* beforementioned, which the *Dutch* had taken from Us during the War, was now confirmed to Them for ever, and by that They became absolute Masters of all the *Cloves* in the *East-Indies*.

VAN BEUNINGHEN, the *Dutch Ambassador* at *Paris*, thought this *Isle* of so great Importance, that He warmly told the *Earl of St. Albans*, and I think impudently enough, that rather than restore It, He Himself would oppose the Resolution of the *States General* tho' there should not be another *Man* in *Holland* to second Him. The *English* it seems had sowed *Cloves* upon the Island, whilest It was in their Possession, which made it so much the Object of the *Dutch East-India Company*, that They would

would not hear of restoring It; but the very same Reason ought to have obliged *Charles II*, never to have made Peace without It.

By the same Article which gave up the *Isle of Poloron*, That of *Surinam* was likewise relinquished to the *Dutch West-India Company*; The Article of the *Flag* was but loosely worded; the Interest of the *House of Orange*, was utterly neglected; and in short, the Peace being made, *De Wit* thought He could do Nothing more glorious than to annihilate the *Stadtholdership of Holland* for ever, which was done by a Resolution of the *States of that Province*, on the 5th of *August 1661*, which is commonly stiled the *Perpetual Edict*. (a)

But tho' the Treaty of *Breda*, had put an End to Hostilities; It was far from restoring a good Intelligence between the two Nations; which Nothing would have done but the Necessity of uniting together, in Order to oppose the ambitious Designs of *LEWIS XIV*, whose Progress in the *Spanish Netherlands*, during the Congress at

(a) See Part I. Page 243.

Breda, having alarmed all his Neighbours, the *Triple League* was concluded in 1668, between *England*, *Sweden*, and the *United Provinces*, and this brought on the *Peace of Aix la Chapelle*, which saved the Remainder of *Flanders* from falling into the Hands of *France*.

AS CHARLES II, had in a great Measure regained the Confidence of his Subjects, by the Conclusion of the *Triple League*, to the Share He had in making the Treaty of *Aix la Chapelle*, recovered the Reputation He had lost Abroad, by the Treaty of *Breda*. And as the *Dutch* were now very justly allarmed with the ambitious Designs of *Lewis XIV*, and of Consequence very desirous to maintain a perfect Friendship with *England*, if this Disposition had been well cultivated, on the Part of *Charles II*, It is highly probable that He might have brought the *States General* into his Dependance, and have prevailed with the *States of Holland*, to reverse the Resolutions They had taken to the prejudice of the *Prince of Orange*. But instead of pursuing these Measures, He unhappily fell into Engagements with *Lewis XIV*, that were at once directly opposite to those He had entered into by Virtue of the *Triple Alliance*, as well as inconsistent with his own Honour,

Honour, the Good of his *Kingdom*, and the Welfare of *Europe* in General.

In 1670, LEWIS XIV, sent the DUTCH-
 CHESSE of ORLEANCE to *Dover*, where
 She had an Interview with the *King* her
Brother, and then It was that *Charles II*,
 was engaged, not only to break the *Tri-
 ple League*, but even to attack the *United
 Provinces* in Conjunction with *Lewis XIV*.
 Few Persons are ignorant of the Particu-
 lars of the War, which was accordingly
 declared against the *States General*, by
France and *England*, in 1672. It was up-
 on this Occasion that my *Lord Chancellor
 Shaftsbury*, in a famous Speech in the
House of Lords, applied the *Delenda Carthago*,
 to the *Republic* of the *United Provinces*, and
 gave It as his Opinion, that the *Dutch*
 were not only to be humbled, but total-
 ly destroy'd. The *Court* published, that
 the *English* were to have *Holland* and
Zealand, when They should be conquered;
 but this the *French* deny entirely; nor in-
 deed, did *Lewis XIV*, or his General the
Duke of Luxemburg make any Step, whilst
 in *Holland*, that looked like putting the
 Places conquered in that *Province*, into the
 Hands of the *English*; so that had the
 Projects of the two *Kings* succeeded accor-
 ding to their wish, It is to be presumed,
 Nn 2 that

that *Charles II*, would have found Himself, the *Dupe* of the *French King's* Policy, after having been the Instrument of his Ambition. But the *Parliament*, justly apprehensive of the growing Power of *France*, obliged the *King* to make a separate Peace with the *Dutch* in 1674, which being done, his *Majesty* offered his Mediation, for concluding One between *France* and the *United Provinces*, with the other Powers that had taken Part in the War; but his Mediation having produced no Effect, the *Parliament* addressed the *King*, in 1667, with a great deal of Earnestness, begging that his *Majesty* would please to interest Himself more effectually for putting a Stop to the Progress of the *French Arms*, and for the Safety of the *Spanish Netherlands*; ‘ In the
‘ Preservation and Security of which, They
‘ humbly conceived the *Interest* of his *Majesty*, and the *Safety* of his *People* were
‘ highly concerned; and therefore, They
‘ most humbly besought Him, to take the
‘ same into his *Royal Care*, and to strengthen
‘ Himself with such stricter Alliances as
‘ might secure his *Majesty's* Kingdoms, preserve the said *Spanish Netherlands*, and
‘ thereby quiet the Minds of his *People*. (a)

(a) See the Journal of the House of Commons, 1667.

The *Lords* concurred with the *Commons* in this Address, which was followed by six more to the same Purpose, and enforced with such vigorous Resolutions, that the *King* found Himself obliged, notwithstanding the Hazard He ran of losing the *French King's* Friendship, to conclude a defensive Alliance with the *States General*, in *January 1678*, which was succeeded by Another in *March*, and a Third in *July* following, which together brought on the Peace of *Nimeghen* in the Month of *August* of the same Year; and This was the last Treaty of Consequence in which *England* interfered with the Interest of the *United Provinces*, during the rest of *Charles the Second's* Reign, with whom I shall end my Deduction of the *Alliances* that have been formed between the *Kings of England* and the *States General*; the View we have taken of the Transactions of the several Reigns already considered, joyned to a Knowledge of the present State of *Great Britain* and the *United Provinces*, being sufficient to instruct us, what are the real Interests of the two *Nations*, how They interfere, and what Proportion their Forces and Power bear to each other.

We have seen *QUEEN ELIZABETH* refuse the *Sovereignty* of the *United Provinces*, because She would not hazard a War with *Philip II*, nor engage the Honour of the *Crown* in the Maintainance of a Point, which as Things then stood, might have proved a greater Charge to Her, than *England* was equal to. But She lent Them considerable Sums, which her own Frugality enabled her to spare, and at the same Time exacted such Pledges as might serve to secure the *Gratitude* of her new *Allies* if successful, or to appease and oblige *Spain*, by a well timed Surrendry, had that *Crown* been able to have reduced the *revolted Provinces* to their former Obedience.

JAMES I, should not have parted with the *Cautionary Towns*; which were no sooner restored, than the *Dutch*, unsatisfied with their own large Share of *Commerce*, and forgetful of past Obligations, began to undermine the Trade of *England*; omitting no Sort of foul Play to bring about their Design, in which They persisted with Impunity, during the rest of this *King's* inglorious Reign, and all that of his unfortunate Successor.

The War between *England* and *Holland* in *Cromwel's* Time, was begun and ended with a View to the *Protector's* personal Interest.
Had

Had *Cromwel* entered into It for the sake of *Trade*, and persisted in It, 'till He had procured us a Share in the *Commerce* of the *fine Spices*, and settled Us upon an equal Footing with the *Dutch*, in the *East-Indies*, He would have done his Country an inestimable Service. Nor was there any Danger in humbling *Holland* at this Time, because the *Ballance* of Power was not yet so much broke between *France* and *Spain*, as to make the Welfare of the *United Provinces*, necessary to the Preservation of the *Spanish Netherlands*.

But *Cromwel* assisted to destroy this *Balance*, by declaring against *Spain*; and It was so much broke at the *Restoration*, that I fear *CHARLES II*, is not to be excused for entering into the *first Dutch War*; but we cannot own this, without reflecting on the immoderate Ambition of *John De Wit*, and his cruel Treatment of the *House of Orange*, which certainly contributed to force *Charles II*, into the Arms of *France*.

During the Reign of this Prince, the Sentiments of *England*, concerning our Interest with the *United Provinces*, were divided into Extreams. The *Courtiers* considered Them as our great Rivals in *Trade*, and *maritime Power*; It was said, there

could be no compounding where the Contest was for the *Commerce of the whole World*, and from hence They concluded, that either *England* or *Holland* must be destroy'd. The Country Party on the other Hand, looked upon Them as our best Friends, or as Mr. *Waller* phrases It, *Our Out-Guard on the Continent*, They believed the Security of the *Dutch* essential to our own, and were zealous to promote their Power, without being in the least concerned about the *Rivalship* so much insisted upon by the other Side.

At the *Revolution*, the Interest of *England* did really become the same with that of the *United Provinces*, and had *WILLIAM III.* left Children behind Him, our *Princes* must have been *hereditary Stadtholders*, of six of the *United Provinces*, which in Time would have brought on such a *Coalition*, as was projected by *Oliver Cromwel*.

The *French War* continued to make a *Union of Councils* between the two Nations very necessary, 'till the Power of *France* was reduced, and the Security of the *Netherlands* provided for, in the Manner It is by the *Barrier Treaty* of 1715, and there are some general Points, which still continue to make a good Understanding essential

sential to the Happiness of either People; such as the Interest of the *Protestant Religion* and the several *Guarantees* into which the *Dutch* are entered, in Conjunction with *Great Britain*, as well with Respect to our foreign Interests, as our Domestick Affairs, the Principal of which are the *Succession* of the *Crown* in our present *Royal Family*; and the Renunciation made by the present *King of Spain*, to the *Crown of France*, at the *Treaty of Utrecht*. Yet I will venture to say, there is not that *Sameness of Interests* between the two Nations, that subsisted from the *Revolution* to the *Peace of Utrecht*, and I hope we are now in a Temper to receive a middle Doctrine, between the two Extreams that reigned during the Time of *CHARLES II.* *The DUTCH are our Rivals in TRADE and NAVIGATION, yet They must not be destroy'd; They are really our OUTGUARD upon the CONTINENT, and yet we may do too much for Them.*

The only great Points of Commerce in which the *Dutch* exceed the *English*, are *Navigation*, the *East-India Trade*, and the several *Sea Fisheries*. The first, is owing to the cheapness of their *Freight*, and this proceeds from the advantageous Trade they drive with *Germany* and the *Baltick*, by which They are supplied with *Fimber*, and all sorts of
Naval

naval Stores cheaper than the *English*; to which must be added, their parsimonious Method of Living, a Point in which our Countrymen will never equal Them; and therefore We cannot think of making the *Exchange of Commodities*, between the *Northern and Southern Parts of Europe*, by *English Ships*, unless We should first resolve, to make Use of the present vast Superiority of our *naval Force*, to ruin the *Province of Holland* entirely, which it would be Cruelty to think of.

As to the *East-India Trade*, the *English* have certainly Reason to envy *Holland* the Monopoly of the *fine Spices*; and tho' I will not pretend to say, that We ought to make Use of our present Superiority, to wrest any of the *Spice Islands* from the *Dutch*, which however would be returning the same Usage We have received from Them when They were Strongest, yet there may perhaps be Places in the same *Latitude* with the *Molucca Islands*, which They are not yet possessed of, and where the *English* might settle, and plant the *fine Spices*. Such a Design is not at all unworthy the utmost Consideration of our *East-India Company*, and it cannot be doubted but the *Crown* would be very ready to countenance
an

an undertaking, which would render the *East-India Trade*, of infinite Advantage to the Nation.

As to the *Herring, Cod, and Whale Fisheries*, from which the *Dutch* are supposed to derive as great a Profit as They do from their *East-India Trade*, We have the Pleasure to see the Last of Them undertaken to very great Advantage by our *South-Sea Company*; and for the *Cod Fishery*, I own, I hope never to see it in the Hands of any particular set of Men, because it would be infinitely profitable to the Nation in General, and may be undertaken by private Adventurers with a Certainty of Success.

There is no Secret in the *Salting of Cod*, and our *Merchants* that inhabit the *Northern Coasts of England*, lie full as well as the *Dutch*, for sending their Vessels to the *Dogger-Bank*, and would have this Advantage over Them, *That the best Bait in the World for Cod, is to be found no where in so great Quantities as in England; I mean the Fish called a Lamprey, of which the Dutch buy up from our inland Fishermen all that they can possibly procure.*

The *Herring Fishery* is of far greater Consequence than the former. I will not pretend to enter into the Famous Question, *Whether the Sea is free or not*, because I could not
hope

hope to say any Thing new upon a Subject that has employed the two best Pens of the last Age; (a) but I will set down what I know of the Manner in which the *Dutch* carry on this Trade, which may possibly be of some Service to those who may hereafter undertake it in *Great-Britain*.

I have already spoken of the Number of *Busses* that the *Dutch* employ in the *Herring Fishery*. (b) They are fitted out in the Month of *May*, and are obliged by an Ordinance of the *States General*, not to cast their Nets before the 24th. of *June*, the Reason of which I take to be, that the *Sholes* may not be broke, before all the *Busses* are got together; which would be equally prejudicial to the Public, as advantageous to those who had the good Luck to be first upon the Coast of *Scotland*.

On the 24th. of *June*, new Stile, they begin to fish on the *North-West Coast* of *Scotland*, with Nets that are excessively long and deep, and the Reader may easily figure to Himself, the vast Havock that is made by seven or eight hundred *Busses*,

(a) *Selden* and *Grotius*, See *Mare clausum*, and *Mare liberum*

(b) See Part 2, Page 268.

which

which cast their Nets close to One Another, amongst Fish that swim in *Sholes* like the young Fry in our fresh Water Rivers.

The Moment the Net is drawn, Part of the Crew set about cutting the *Herrings*, which pass from their Hands into Others, that pack them up as quick as possible with *French Salt* & Pickle, into clean Casks which are instantly stowed away in the Hold.

The first *Herrings* that are taken, are immediately dispatched for *Holland*, on Board small vessels that attend the *Busses* with Provisions, and are sold at extravagant Prices; the People of Fashion are as fond of them, as we are of *Mackerel* in the begining of the Season, and when They come to be plentiful the common People eat Them with Greediness, and believe them a Specific for whatever Distemper They are troubled with.

When the *Busses* have caught a sufficient Quantity They make what Sail they can to *Holland*, where They are unloaded and refitted for the Sea in a few Days. In the mean Time, the *Herrings*, which are said to make an annual Tour round the Island of great *Britain*, are considerably advanced ; and constant Experience has taught the

the *Dutch* where to fall in with Them with as much Certainty as at first.

Whilst the *Busses* are out upon their second Voyage, their Proprietors are not idle in *Holland*, where the *Herrings* are taken out of their *Sea-Package*, put into large Tubs with fresh Salt and Pickle, and repacked into Casks for Exportation.

This is the History of the *Herring Fishery* in little, which is attended with all those Advantages I have mentioned in the second Part of this Book. (a) As to what is said of a particular Secret amongst the *Dutch* in the Manner of Salting their *Herrings*, I believe it a Chimera, the whole Art consisting in an extream Neatness in all the Materials used in the Manufactory, and in curing the *Herrings* as soon as *They* are taken, or if I may use the Expression, in killing them with the very Salt with which *They* are pickled, before the Air and Sun have made any impression upon Them.

It is incontestable that the *Herring Fishery* may be carried on to very great Advantage by the People of *England* and *Scotland*, did *They* apply Themselves to It in the same

(a) See Part II. Page 266.

Manner with the *Dutch*, which was lately attempted by a *Fishing Company* in *Scotland*, who took a Subscription in the Year 1720, built Vessels in Imitation of the *Dutch Busses* and had People, Nets and Utensils from *Holland*: Yet the Attempt was attended with so little Success, that I am informed the *Company* have some Time since sold off their *Busses*, and other Materials.

The common Methods of *Fishing* practised by the Inhabitants of *Scotland*, is in small open Boats where the *Herrings* are exposed to the Sun till the Boat is fully loaded, and are consequently so much heated before They are brought on Shore that They become unfit to take Salt, which is the true Reason of the great Disparity between the *Scotch* and *Dutch Herrings*.

Another Disadvantage that arises from the smalness of the *Scotch Fishing Boats* is their being unable to follow the *Herrings*, when the Wind is so tempestuous as to force them out of the *Shallows*, into deep Water; whereas the *Dutch* keep the Sea in all Weathers, by which They often have the *Herrings* to Themselves; and if We may believe the *Scotch*, They are frequently so malicious, as to run in close upon the Coast, even after They have taken their own Cargoes, on purpose
to

to *break the Scholes and interrupt the Scotch Fishermen*, which it is very easy to do from the Superiority of their Vessels.

Why *England* has neglected to improve this *Fishery*, can be owing to nothing but the Necessity We have been under of living in perfect Friendship and Harmony with the *Dutch*, for forty Years past; nor will I presume to say when it may be our Interest to *assert the Right of our Coast*, to the prejudice of the *Hollander*; but I will venture to observe, that it is a very great Happiness to have so great a Resource as the *Herring Fishery* in our Power, which may be an excellent Nursery for *Seamen*, and give Employment to our Poor, in that Time, when from the Improvements that may be made in other Nations, there may come to be a less Demand for our *Manufactures* than at present, which may perhaps deserve to be a little more thought of than it is, even at this Juncture.

These are the principal Points in which the Interests of *Great Britain* and *Holland*, interfere with each other. There are many other Articles however of an inferiour Nature that may deserve Consideration. Of These, I shall take the Liberty to mention, *Linnen, Slit Deals, and Wainscot Boards*, the first of which we import from *Holland*, in
vast

vast Quantities, very much to the Prejudice
 of the People of *Ireland*, who I am told,
 expect that we should make some Alteration
 for the Promotion of a *Manufactory* amongst
 Them, which is perhaps the only One We
 can encourage in that Kingdom without
 great Prejudice to Ourselves. But it can-
 not be expected that *England* should make
 such a Step, whilst They themselves con-
 tinue wantonly to import great Quantities
 of *Dutch Linnen*, tho' they have so good of
 their own. The Importation of *Deals* and
Wainscot Boards into *England*, proceeds from
 an *Act of Parliament*, which forbids the Use
 of *Sawing Mills* within such a Dimension;
 and tho' I would not be thought Guilty
 of presuming to oppose my Sentiments to
 those of the Legislature, yet if there be any
 Truth in the Proverb, that says, *A Penny
 saved is a Penny got*, and if it be true that
*Numbers of People make the Riches of a Coun-
 try*, then surely We ought to encourage all
Machines that serve to rescind Labour, which
 is in Effect to multiply our Inhabitants, None
 of whom ought to be idle, whilst there re-
 mains a Piece of *Waste Land* in *England*,
 a *River* choaked up that may be made *Na-
 vigable*, or even a *Ditch* neglected, that might
 O o be

be improved into a *Canal*, in Order to reduce the Price of *Transportation*, which is so heavy a Clog upon *Commerce*.

I come now to close this Book with observing something concerning Negotiations with the STATES GENERAL, which from the Diversity of Domestick Interests in the *United Provinces* are perhaps more difficult at the HAGUE than in any other Court of *Europe*.

It is the Interest of *Holland*, *Zealand*, *Frize-land* and *Groninghen*, to have great *Fleets*, that may secure their *Commerce*, and contest the Dominion of the *Sea* with *ENGLAND*, or any other Maritime Power; whereas *Gelderland* and *Overyssel*, which make the *Frontier* of the *United Provinces*, depend on the Goodness of their Fortifications, and the Strength of their *Army*; and as for *Utrecht*, tho' it be an *Inland Province*, yet it has been seldom known to dissent from *Holland*, which with the Other *Maritime Provinces*, is very hardly brought into a Resolution to contribute for the Expence of the *Fortifications* and the *Army*, the best Posts of which are enjoyed by the Nobility of *Gelderland* and *Overyssel*, whilst These are equally backward to give Money for the *Protection* of *Commerce*, in the Welfare of which they are no farther concerned, than may enable the *Province*

vince of Holland to pay that very large Proportion which She is obliged to furnish for the Support of the whole.

The Reader will easily imagine that *Public Ministers* find It hard to conciliate such a Variety of Interests, which together with the *Unanimity required by the Constitution of the Republic in all Affairs relating to Peace and War*; is the Cause, that *Negotiations* with their *High Mightinesses*, always run very slow; and I believe there is no Method to cure this, except taking Resolutions in *Conjunction* with the *Province of Holland*, separately from the Rest.

This, indeed, is very seldom practised; but *Holland* will sometimes venture upon It, and when constant to her own Resolution, has never failed to bring over her *Sister Provinces*. Nor will This appear strange, when we consider, that She alone pays, as I have observed above, near *fifty eight per Cent.* of the whole Expences of the *Republic*; (a) so that it is easy to *Negotiate* with the *United Provinces*, when the *Grand Pensionary of Holland* is a Person of such Authority, as to be able to answer for his *Province*, which *John De Wit* could always do; But when this Minister proves to be a Man of common Abilities and mode-

(a) See Part I. Page 135.

rate Credit, there is no Expedient so good in Order to come to a quick Decision, as to apply to the *City of Amsterdam*. I have been informed, that this *Town* alone, hindered the *States General* from acceding to the *Quadruple Alliance*: But be that as it will, 'tis certain She has the same Superiority over the *Towns of Holland*, that *Holland* has over the other *Provinces*, and consequently a Negotiation would succeed better at the *Hague*, when the principal Points of It had been adjusted with the *Regents of Amsterdam*: wherefore I have often wondered that the KING of PRUSSIA, should be the only Prince in *Europe*, who entertains a *Resident* there; the Rest having only *Agents*, little capable of any Negotiation of Importance.

Another Reason why the *maritime Powers* of *Europe* should employ Ministers of the second Order, or *Consuls* at least with the SENATE of AMSTERDAM, is that this City is the chief Seat of the *Dutch East India Company*, which is known to be Mistress of so Prodigious a Power, that She may almost boast an *Independant Sovereignty*, nor does She stick to make *By-Laws* in the *Indies*, altogether inconsistent with the *Treaties of Commerce* entered into by the *States General* in *Europe*.

F I N I S

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